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ABSTRACT 
Homeland security is a responsibility to be shared across the nation.  
Resource demands, differing cultures, and varying motivations result in 
frustration and confusion that conflict with the nation’s need to collaborate and 
cooperate.  As such, the homeland security enterprise appears to be imploding 
from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, competitive funding, and 
mistrust, which cause stakeholders to wonder where they fit in this complex, 
interdependent environment. 
This study examines reports, literature, and studies, along with interviews 
of homeland security executives from the four levels of government.  It is argued 
and supported by the research that enhancing the nation’s ability to collaborate 
involves a hybrid approach, where operational functions are decentralized and 
intelligence functions are centralized.  The operational component encourages 
growth from the bottom of the enterprise through a decentralized block-grant 
process that allows jurisdictions to address their unique demands.  The 
intelligence component recommends comprehensive reform and uses the 
nation’s layered system of government as a portal to provide situational 
awareness at all levels. 
Collectively, the study’s recommendations create an environment ripe for 
collaboration, where leaders capitalize on the strengths of interconnectivity and 
continuously add value so that the synergy of combined efforts positively 
influences the homeland security enterprise. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Homeland security is a responsibility to be shared across the nation.  
Resource demands, differing cultures, and varying motivations result in 
frustration and confusion that conflict with the nation’s need to collaborate and 
cooperate.  As such, the homeland security enterprise appears to be imploding 
from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, competitive funding, and 
mistrust, which cause stakeholders to wonder where they fit in this complex 
interdependent environment. 
While human emotion and interpersonal relationships are at the core of 
this complexity, it is hypothesized that environmental conditions exacerbate the 
frustration and confusion.  In pursuit of a solution, this study examines reports, 
literature, and studies, along with interviews of homeland security executives 
from the four levels of government to identify gaps in the homeland security 
enterprise.  Collectively, the research reflects gaps resulting from a lack of trust, 
fragmented communications, and inadequate funding mechanisms. 
These gaps form the core chapters of this thesis, which are supported by 
research and reflect that determining where homeland security stakeholders, fit 
in the homeland security enterprise involves enhancing the nation’s collaborative 
capacity.  It is argued that building such capacity involves a hybrid approach, 
where operational functions are decentralized and intelligence functions are 
centralized.  The decentralized operational component encourages growth from 
the bottom of the enterprise by consolidating Department of Homeland Security 
Grants with similar goals and objectives, and allocating this funding through a 
decentralized block grant that allows jurisdictions the autonomy to address their 
unique demands.  Meeting local demands engages communities at the bottom of 
the enterprise and encourages the growth of small trustful relationships that 
serve as the foundation for enterprise-wide growth. 
 xiv
In contrast, the intelligence component involves comprehensive reform 
and uses the layered federalist system of government to delineate roles and 
provide portals for the free-flow of intelligence that promotes situational 
awareness at all levels.  This more structured approach consolidates domestic 
intelligence responsibilities within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
reallocates intelligence personnel from other federal agencies, thereby 
capitalizing on existing human resources and minimizing expenses. 
In its entirety, the study’s recommendations create an environment ripe for 
collaboration, where leaders capitalize on the strengths of interconnectivity and 
continuously add value so that the synergy of the combined efforts positively 
influences the homeland security enterprise.  According to Ryan and Shu, “It is 
up to a few good leaders in each organization to challenge the status quo. . . . if 
there is anything certain . . . it is its uncertainty” (2009, p. 41).  Homeland security 
needs “A new brand of collaborative and innovative leadership” (Elkington, 2008, 
p. 1).  It is up to homeland security leaders to create an environment conducive 
to collaboration by realizing that interconnectivity is a strength, not a hindrance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
According to the United States Office of Homeland Security, “To best 
protect the American people, homeland security must be a responsibility shared 
across our entire Nation” (2002, p. 5). Such a shared endeavor requires 
cooperation and collaboration, which is often in conflict with organizational 
cultures, demands on resources, and varying motivations (Temple, 2007, pp. 20–
28).  These complexities and those described herein are a source of confusion 
and frustration throughout the homeland security enterprise and likely cause the 
various stakeholders to wonder where they fit.  The readers of this thesis may 
notice this initial theme is used to introduce the various chapters of this study.  
This is not an oversight, but instead it is purposefully reintroduced to draw 
attention to the competing complexities of this multifarious environment. 
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security transitions from a 
narrow focus on terrorism to an expansive all-hazards strategy.  As a result, 
states and locals are forced to sustain operations without federal assets for a 
minimum of 72 hours (Carafano, 2008, p. 2).  These broad expectations cause 
states and localities to attempt to do everything with limited resources, thereby 
potentially detracting from their day-to-day community commitments.  Colonel 
Dean Esserman, the police chief in Providence, Rhode Island notes: 
I have a healthy respect for the federal government and the 
importance of keeping this nation safe. . . . But I also live every day 
as a police chief in an American city where violence every day is 
not foreign and is not anonymous but is right out there in the 
neighborhoods (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1). 
Chief Esserman’s comment reflects his frustration over deploying 
resources to combat violence in his community, while attempting to meet the 
demands of homeland security. Similar frustrations were noted by the 
participants of this research project.  One local respondent noted, “It is apparent 
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that many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often 
times do not play well with each other” (Interviews, 2009). 
Initially, it was presumed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
would help to overcome these issues and provide a direct opportunity for 
localities to engage with the federal government, thus, changing the 
government’s organizational culture and eliminating many of the prior 
complications and frustrations (Wortzel, 2003).  However, after six years, “We 
have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to multiple homeland 
security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended and unintended 
consequences” (Bellavita, 2006).  This confusing environment makes it difficult 
for anyone to know “with certainty what our homeland security strategy actually 
is” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 13), and how they may actually influence it in a positive 
direction. 
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Integration, 
Management, and Oversight, Representative Mike Rogers stated, “I think there is 
an integration problem among the agencies. I think there is a glaring problem of 
inadequate integration between the Homeland and the states and the local 
governments” (House. Committee on Homeland Security, 2005, p. 65).  In other 
words, there is a lack of unified focus among the various homeland security 
stakeholders which prevents them from working together as a team across 
organizational boundaries. 
Problems with integration and working together across boundaries draw 
attention to the need to enhance collaboration.  Enhancing collaborative capacity 
results in synergy and innovation, thereby allowing the myriad of homeland 
security stakeholders to see value in joining together to combat the challenges of 
an ambiguous future.  To address future challenges, Secretary Chertoff (2006), 
asserts the nation must urgently reorient its approach to homeland security with 
flexibility and resolve.  It is argued throughout this thesis that reorienting the 
nation’s approach must involve efforts to enhance collaborative capacity as “The 
task ahead is too formidable for any single institution” (Klitgaard & Treverton, 
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2003, p. 8). A failure to embrace these challenges may encourage further 
enterprise degradation, as complacency and a failure to adapt to the changing 
environment may potentially lead to homeland security’s demise.  After all, even 
the once almighty dinosaurs failed to adapt and ultimately suffered extinction 
(Sagarin, 2003). 
Considering collaborative capacity results from a compilation of factors 
such as communication, trust, leadership, and learning (Getha-Taylor, 2008), it is 
reasonable to conclude that when these and/or other elements are missing, the 
ability to enhance capacity suffers.  Each of these elements surfaced during the 
research for this study (Interviews, 2009); some examples are noted below: 
 
 Communication 
 Concern of open lane of communication.  We hope we are 
getting the appropriate information to best serve the greater 
good. 
 Concerned about receiving the proper information and that 
we are being kept in the loop. 
 Trust 
 Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies. 
Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. It is 
apparent that many federal agencies are inefficient, have 
communication issues, and often times do not play well with 
each other. 
 My concern is other stakeholders may not take the threat 
seriously. 
 Leadership 
 My primary concern on this incident is the reaction of the 
various layers of leadership among the responding agencies 
and governments. 
 Funding has caused turf wars among agencies.  A cookie 
cutter approach was utilized by DHS in the appropriation of 
grant funds. 
 Learning 
 Many agencies understand the need for cooperation. 
However, understanding the need and acting on it do not 
always happen in unison. 
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 Needs to be more joint training between local government 
and federal government.  Locals and feds would be well 
served to form and enhance the personal relationships 
between the two groups. 
The literature and thesis interviews (2009) reflect frustrated 
states/localities seek a flexible future of clarity, where the federal system listens 
and responds to concerns, and they (states and locals) have the autonomy to 
address jurisdiction specific demands.  For example, the recent DHS Grant 
Requirement for localities to guard against improvised explosive devices (U. S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1) triggered frustration and 
confusion, as localities feel the federal government is not listening to their 
concerns and continues to force them to spend dollars on vague threats (Schmitt 
& Johnston, 2008, p. 1–2).  Although mandates such as this are frustrating, 
localities must comply, as they are dependent upon the grant funding to help 
offset the burdens of establishing and maintaining a state of readiness.  Samuel 
Clovis (2006) refers to this federal leverage as coercive federalism; a command 
and control strategy that that is not conducive to collaborative and cooperative 
relationships among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to discern that coercive grant strategies function as disincentives to collaborative 
capacity. 
In addition to the grant concerns are communication concerns.  
Repeatedly noted during the interviews (2009) conducted for this study was 
skepticism and mistrust surrounding the sharing of applicable 
information/intelligence.  This is such a concern that the former national security 
advisor asserts the safest place for a terrorist is in the United States; that is, 
provided they do not do something to unnecessarily draw attention to his/herself 
(Burch, 2007). 
In the United States, the primary responsibility for intelligence rest with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  However, there are numerous agencies 
engaged in intelligence collection and dissemination, as well as numerous 
oversight bodies.  This fragmentation makes information sharing difficult and 
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confusing, which adds to the mistrust that clearly surfaced during this study 
(Interviews, 2009).  The culmination of these and other concerns cause some to 
call for a domestic intelligence agency independent of the FBI.  This in itself 
presents an entirely new set of concerns.  After all, how will more bureaucracy 
make it easier to communicate with just fewer than 19,000 separate police 
agencies across the country? 
For guidance, the nation must look to domestic intelligence successes 
around the world.  Such an analysis, offers insight into potential improvements 
for United States domestic intelligence efforts.  These improvements potentially 
provide clarity, which will assist in reducing the competition and confusion across 
the enterprise. A new/revised environment is likely more conducive to 
cooperation and collaboration, as it fosters trust and interdependency. 
Considering these issues and in an effort to encourage evolution and 
enhance the overall homeland security enterprise, this research examines these 
challenges and proposes recommendations that will encourage collaboration in 
the complex world of homeland security.  As used, the term evolution is intended 
to reflect growth and learning, where growth reflects development, not 
necessarily an increase of size. It is theorized that many of the answers lie in 
three significant and seemingly interconnected areas. 
First, the research identifies problems surrounding collaboration between 
the various levels of government, thoroughly examines the applicable literature, 
and makes recommendations to enhance collaborative capacity throughout the 
homeland security enterprise. Second, the research identifies how the 
Department of Homeland Security Grant procedures may be revised to avoid 
functioning as a disincentive to collaboration.  Recommendations are offered for 
improving the process, thereby contributing to the overall effort to build 
collaborative capacity.  Third, the research examines the complexities 
surrounding intelligence sharing and seeks to make qualitative recommendations 
to enhance the nation’s intelligence community.  It is anticipated that research 
will support a revised/reformed strategy that improves communication, therefore, 
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positively contributing to efforts to enhance collaborative capacity throughout the 
homeland security enterprise. Collectively, the methodology of enhancing 
collaborative capacity will aid in helping all stakeholders understanding where 
they fit in the homeland security enterprise. 
The application of evolutionary thinking to homeland security is in itself 
challenging, but even more challenging is the application of evolutionary thinking 
in a broad-based or macro manner to homeland security. Perhaps, this is caused 
by the enterprise’s inability to imagine future threats, take risks, give up control, 
and/or strive for innovative solutions. Regardless, homeland security must 
continue to evolve with respect for civil liberties deeply rooted in the nation’s 
federalist principles.  This developmental process requires us all to collaborate 
and cooperate in an effort to enhance the overall homeland security enterprise. 
The subsequent chapters examine applicable literature, published reports 
and studies, focus group feedback, and success factors within homeland security 
to offer recommendations for enhancing the positives and minimizing the 
negatives.  The goal of this study is to help all homeland security stakeholders 
understand where they fit in the enterprise and better prepare the nation for the 
evolving challenges of an uncertain future. 
A. ARGUMENT 
Is homeland security about terrorism?  Is it all-hazards? Is it national 
security?  The answer seems to be, “It depends.”  That is, it may be all hazards 
for localities, but terrorism for the Department of Defense.  Because it is difficult 
to define and may mean different things to different stakeholders, the strategy to 
address homeland security concerns must be flexible and evolve depending 
upon the circumstances.  However, there must be an effective mode of moving 
information/intelligence, referred to from this point forward as intelligence, 
throughout the enterprise.  Such a timely flow of intelligence promotes situational 
awareness at all levels of government and lends itself to a more rigid 
structure/process.   
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Whether it is defining homeland security or swiftly moving intelligence, the 
homeland security enterprise is comprised of people, who must work together to 
deal future threats and uncertainty. Therefore, any strategic changes must 
consider the need to enhance cooperation and collaboration in this unique and 
complex world.  For these reasons, it is argued in this thesis that the future 
includes a hybrid strategy, where some aspects are structured and others 
decentralized.  It is believed that such an approach will create the synergy that 
will promote enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares the nation for 
the challenges of the future. 
At the core of this argument are three main themes.  These include the 
consolidation of homeland security grants, reforming domestic intelligence, and 
enhancing collaborative capacity. It is argued that homeland security grants with 
similar goals and objectives should be consolidated and administered as block 
grants to the states and locals. This process allows states and localities to 
address their unique homeland security needs in a manner consistent with 
national goals and objectives.  These national goals and objectives provide the 
mission or ideology to enhance integration and capacity for national 
preparedness and prevention. In addition, local governments are able to meet 
the demands of their citizenry in manner consistent with federalist principles.  
Additionally, it is believed that this block-grant approach will encourage and 
facilitate small collaborations, thus promoting interaction and interdependency 
among jurisdictions.  This decentralized approach will encourage the small 
collaborations to expand and evolve, therefore, promoting trust and building 
capacity. 
Contrarily, research suggests that localities/states complain that existing 
intelligence sharing is inadequate.  To address this dynamic, it is argued that 
reform is needed to establish a centralized structure that will aid in moving 
intelligence vertically and horizontally throughout the homeland security 
enterprise, thereby providing situational awareness and “connecting the dots” at 
the various levels of government (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
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the United States, 2004).  As with the collaboration component, the free-flow of 
intelligence will promote enterprise-wide trust.  While there have been some 
discussions across government that the remedy lies in the creation of a domestic 
intelligence agency, it is argued in this thesis that additional bureaucracy is not 
the answer.  Instead, building upon existing organizational structures and 
expertise, FBI reform facilitates the consolidation of intelligence in an 
organization with an understanding of the criminal prosecution and the collection 
and dissemination of intelligence. It is believed such reform will promote 
situational awareness and a culture of preparedness. 
While the critical reader may assert that centralization of intelligence will 
draw considerable resistance from states/locals, it is believed that this effort will 
initially be viewed as a trade off for the decentralization of grant funding to allow 
localities to address jurisdictional specific needs.  Additionally, as the system 
develops and states/locals see positive outcomes, support will grow.  Overtime, 
this hybrid strategy will enhance homeland security’s capacity to collaborate, 
thereby creating the nation’s new normalcy (Chertoff, 2006). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Considering the complexities and ambiguities surrounding homeland 
security and the frustrations of the various security stakeholders, this research 
seeks to answer the question, “Where do we fit in the homeland security 
enterprise?”  That is, how do the various homeland security stakeholders climb 
from the “bubbling swamp of intended and unintended consequences?” 
(Bellavita, 2006, p. 4). For the purposes of this thesis, the term “we” is 
periodically used to reflect the various homeland security stakeholders.  The goal 
of this thesis is not to merely discuss the complexities of the problem.  The goal 
of this thesis is to provide substantive recommendations that will serve to 
enhance the positives and reduce the negatives in an effort to promote further 
strategic innovation for the overall homeland security enterprise. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Look to the essence of a thing, whether it be a point of doctrine, of 
practice, or of interpretation. 
Marcus Aurelius (121–180) 
Two hundred years after the United States Constitution was ratified, the 
nation still seeks the desired approach to effectively address the challenges of an 
uncertain future.  Addressing these challenges appears to involve a better 
understanding what homeland security is, enhancing the ability to work together 
and share information throughout the enterprise, and understanding the 
environment that affects these dynamics.  For these reasons, literature from 
three distinct areas is examined in this review.  These are: the definition of 
homeland security, federalism, and collaborative capacity. 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINED 
Homeland security is a relatively new concept that sparks great debate 
ranging from defining the term of homeland security to how to best navigate its 
ambiguous future. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines 
homeland security as “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (U.S. Homeland 
Security Council, 2007, p. 3).  However, additional research supports an evolving 
homeland security definition based on the initial 2002 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, 2006 National Security Strategy, and 2006 National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorism (White House Office, 2008a & b, p. 1). 
Christopher Bellavita (2008, p. 15) explored this evolving world of 
homeland security and asserts it is best described metaphorically as an 
ecosystem where the respective organisms represent their particular interest as 
they struggle to grow and evolve within a biological system.  He describes seven 
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widely accepted definitions of homeland security, as depicted in the below table, 
but asserts each of the definitions represent a particular interest in the 
ecosystem.  
Table 1.   Bellavita’s Definitions of Homeland Security (after Bellavita, 2008) 
* Terrorism * All Hazards 
* Terrorism and Catastrophes * Jurisdictional Hazards 
* Meta Hazards * National Security 
* Security Über Alles “a symbol used to justify government efforts to  
curtail civil liberties” (Bellavita, 2008, p. 3) 
 
Bellavita (2008, pp. 3–4) argues that agreeing on a single definition 
implies that homeland security is machine-like.  That is, the various parts of the 
machine are combined in a manner as to direct the behaviors of those who seek 
to make the machine function.  This rigidity is not realistic, as the variety of 
interests in the homeland security system result in an absence of agreement, 
which “Can be seen as grist for the continued evolution of homeland security as 
a practice and as an idea” (Bellavita, 2008, p. 16). 
In contrast, the National Response Framework supports structure and an 
all-hazards homeland security definition (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2008, p. 1).  These primary documents guide much of the nation’s homeland 
security efforts.  Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
embraces the all-hazards definition, as it provides guidance for national 
preparedness.  The all-hazards approach is largely based on the philosophy that 
the items and skills needed to address most emergencies are similar to those 
needed to prepare for and respond to terrorism (Bellavita, 2008, p. 4).  However, 
Bellavita (2008, p. 4) also asserts, “There just is not that much terrorism in the 
United States to warrant spending the billions of dollars we have spent.”  Some in 
Congress assert the excessive spending is nothing more than “pork barrel 
funding, which has contributed little to national security” (Carafano, 2006). 
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Therefore, while the official position of the nation appears to be that 
homeland security is about all hazards, Bellavita’s research supports a 
compilation of the various homeland security interests into a definition that 
evolves as the components of the system seek to advance their respective 
interest.  This concept lends itself to the need to consider interpersonal 
relationships in any homeland security strategy, as a failure to do so likely dooms 
the strategy from the start. 
The literature reflects that while there are many definitions of homeland 
security, there seems to be two overarching themes—the first being that of all 
hazards and the second related to the respective interests of those making up 
the homeland security environment.  Regardless of the position taken, the 
literature supports the significance of evolution (growth and learning) as 
complacency and a failure to adapt to the changing environment may lead to the 
nation’s demise (Sagarin, 2003, p. 2). 
Although this portion of the literature provides an understanding of 
homeland security and its major themes, it is critical to understand that the 
homeland security is comprised of people who must work together to make 
improvements.  Therefore, the next section seeks to build upon the definition of 
homeland security by examining literature associated with enhancing homeland 
security stakeholders’ ability to collaborate. 
B. COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
The literature surrounding collaborative capacity is largely focused on 
enhancing existing relationships in an effort to maximize the outcome of working 
together. As used, collaborative capacity is the product of “Such components as 
trust, communication, intellectual capital, creative opportunity, acceptance of 
leadership and learning . . . with the ability to learn being the most important” 
(Getha-Taylor, 2008, p. 126). Paul Mattessich (2005, p. 2), of the Wilder 
Research Center asserts, “Collaboration is a mutually beneficial and well-defined 
relationship entered into by two or more organizations to achieve common 
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goals.”  Additionally, Mattessich (2005, p. 2) indicates collaboration among 
organizations is the most effective approach because of the complexity and scale 
of issues.  The fact is “The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution” 
(Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8). 
The literature notes the significance of trust and leadership in enhancing 
the capacity of the relationship, as these elements are essential when dealing 
with uncertainty and risk taking. These components of the relationship encourage 
collaboration and allow members of the group to learn from one another, which 
promotes synergy (Kwon, 1998, pp. 1–5; Murphy, 2006, pp. 1–2). Synergy 
results from interactions that “Produce novel combined effects” (Corning, 2007, 
p. 113).  Corning (2007, p. 116) asserts there are several types of synergy; 
however, as used above, synergy is the positive, and often unintended, effects of 
the collaboration being greater than that of a single stakeholder (Corning, 2007, 
p. 116). 
Collectively, the literature supports Paul Mattessich’s (2005, pp. 9–29) six 
concepts for enhancing collaborative capacity.  They are as follows: 
 
 Environment: A history of collaboration and shared respect 
encourages understanding which promotes trust in the process.  
 Membership: Include representatives from each entity affected by 
the relationship.  
 Process: Promotes ownership and partners believe they will benefit 
from collaborating.  
 Communication: Facilitates change over time to address the needs 
of the partners. 
 Purpose: Goals and objectives are clear to each partner and are 
attainable. 
 Resources: Skilled leadership for the collaborative group provides a 
sense of legitimacy.  
 
Other authors offer a more in depth explanations into the respective 
categories, but overall, their research relates similarly to Mattessich’s work.  Of 
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interest is Brafman and Beckstrom’s (2006) book, The Star Fish and the Spider, 
in which decentralization is a key component of collaboration.  The authors 
address Mattessich’s resource component in the form of a catalyst, who initiates 
the idea or ideology, makes introductions, and then backs away from the 
collaboration allowing capacity to evolve through small trustful circles. This 
approach all but eliminates the traditional competitiveness associated with 
groups vying for similar goals.  The goal or ideology unites the collaboration and 
becomes the guiding purpose for which small trustful circles evolve and innovate.  
1. Challenges to Collaborative Capacity 
As the literature supports approaches to enhancing collaborative capacity, 
it also addresses numerous challenges.  These challenges include such things 
as “Loss of control, loss of flexibility, loss of glory, and direct resource costs” 
(Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, pp. 51–53).  Others assert that collaborations are 
often complex, causing some to focus too heavily on the collaboration and 
neglecting the overall strategy.  This is compounded by inevitable conflict, which 
many simply avoid or chose a political compromise, which causes a migration 
from original collaborative goal, discourages people from working together, and 
lessens productivity (Aamodt, 1999, p. 515; Blumenthal, 1995, pp. 1–6).  
Therefore, the literature cautions to avoid viewing collaboration as a panacea.  
Collaboration is filled with challenges and requires a “Balance of pitfalls, [and] 
advantages and disadvantages in favor of collaboration rather than individualism” 
(Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, p. 55). 
Collectively, the literature supports enhancing collaborative capacity from 
the bottom up by building upon small trustful relationships or circles, as clearly, 
“The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution” (Klitgaard & 
Treverton, 2003, p. 8).  Leadership, stakeholder representation, clear goals, and 
communication will aid in overcoming the challenges of the future. Table 2 
summarizes this collaborative capacity section.  
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Table 2.   Collaborative Capacity Highlights 
Low Collaborative Capacity Challenges High Collaborative Capacity 
Members avoid conflict Stakeholders lose independent 
control 
Trust facilitates collaboration 
in the absence of face-to-face 
meetings.  
Group focuses too narrowly 
on the collaboration and 
sacrifices the overall strategy 
Stakeholders lose independent 
flexibility 
Group employs a collaborative 
style of conflict resolution, and 
shared oversight 
Collaboration is compelled Glory is for the collaborative 
group instead of individual 
stakeholders 
Shared responsibility born 
from smaller trustful 
relationships  
Lack trust results in suspicion 
of other stakeholders, which 
leads to a threatening 
environment 
Conflict may keep people from 
working together and lessen 
productivity 
Clear goals, objectives, and 
rewards 
Collaborative champion(s) 
use role as a position of 
power  
Unfamiliar stakeholders may 
lack trust 
Collaborative leadership 
committed to championing the 
collaboration 
Stakeholders believe 
collaboration is a panacea 




impact the collaboration 
The environment has a history 
of collaboration 
Stakeholders fail to relinquish 
independent control 
Politics will always create 
challenges 
Effective and ongoing 
communication 
Goals and objectives are not 
clearly communicated to 
stakeholders 
Competition may discourage 
collaboration 
Innovative technology 
networks smaller collaborative 
groups 
 Communication barriers must 
be overcome 
Mediation process to resolve 
disputes 
 
As with the section on defining homeland security, the review of the 
collaborative capacity literature provides a foundation upon which to build.  That 
is, success factors for a highly collaborative environment emerged that coupled 
with a better understanding of homeland security provide a basis to make 
recommendations for enhancing the homeland security enterprise.  The next 
section seeks to explore the literature surrounding the nation’s federalist 
principles in order to better understand the environment where the change is to 
occur. 
C. FEDERALISM 
The literature in the area of federalism is vast, but well summarized by 
Samuel H. Clovis, Jr., Chair of the Department of Business Administration and 
Economics at Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa.  
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Like Secretary Chertoff (2006, p. 1), Clovis (2006, p. 1) asserts future 
homeland security challenges “Require solutions for which the existing structures 
and paradigms must be changed to ensure the greatest level of preparedness 
possible.”  His research supports a foundation in federalism when examining 
intergovernmental relations, as reorganizations have been driven by the nation’s 
reaction to significant events.  Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, a 
single piece of legislation combined 22 organizations into the Department of 
Homeland Security.  From the onset, Secretary Ridge emphasized federalism as 
the nation’s guiding principle (Clovis, 2006, p. 1).  Additionally, Keith Bea, 
Congressional Research Service, (2005, p. 5), supports a foundation in 
federalism.  Both Bea and Clovis assert the following documents further solidify 
the foundation for homeland security and national preparedness: 
 
 The National Planning Scenarios, 2004; 
 The National Response Plan (NRP), 2004—Now replaced by the 
National Response Framework, 2008; 
 The National Incident Management System (NIMS), 2004; 
 The Universal Task List (UTL), 2005; 
 The Interim National Preparedness Goal (The Goal), 2005; 
 The Target Capabilities List (TCL), 2005 
 The National Homeland Security Strategy, 2002 (Note: now 
replaced by the 2007 strategy); 
 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of  
 Domestic Incidents (HSPD-5), 2003; 
 The transcript of a speech given by then-Secretary Tom Ridge to 
the, National Association of Counties in March of 2004. 
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The nation’s public policy goal is to “Gain the highest level of capability 
with the resources available” (Clovis, 2006, p. 2).  To accomplish this, the 
literature indicates that over time, the various branches of government interpret 
the role of federalism differently, which results in conflict among the myriad of 
stakeholders. In his article, “Federalism, Homeland Security and National 
Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy,” Clovis (2006, 
p. 3) discusses three emerging theories of federalism: cooperative, coercive, and 
competitive.  
1. Cooperative 
The United States Constitution was founded on the concept of shared 
governance, in which each jurisdiction provides the necessary goods and 
services for its citizens (Clovis, 2006, pp. 3–4).  The power for this arrangement 
is found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which allows for all powers not 
specifically designated to the national government to be left to the states (Joint 
Commission on Printing, 2006, p. 5).  A series of events, such as the adoption of 
the Amendments 16 and 17 and the passage of the New Deal gave decidedly 
more power to the federal government.  These events resulted in the concept of 
cooperative federalism, where the principal of negotiation was essential in 
deciding on the role of each level of government (Clovis, 2006, pp. 3–4).   
2. Coercive 
According to Clovis, “The promulgation of grant programs led to the 
inevitable expansion of the national government through the creation of more 
regulatory agencies to oversee the new programs” (2006, p. 6).  Additionally, 
other legislation, such as the No Child Left Behind Act, had similar impact on 
state and local governments, as states were compelled to comply with its 
requirements (Clovis, 2006, p. 12).  According to Krane, “The act was seen as . . 
. punitive and designed to identify problem schools without really dealing with the 
problems that are to be uncovered” (2007, p. 2).  The regulatory control of the 
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grant programs expanded the power of the national government into a coercive 
form of federalism, where the national government gained leverage over the 
states. As Posner explains, “The trends toward the use of coercive tools have 
proven to be durable and long lasting, albeit punctuated by episodes of reform” 
(2007, p. 390).  Posner (2009, p. 391) continues by noting coercive federalism 
causes states and localities to absorb the federally induced costs in a variety of 
ways: 
 
 Statutory direct order mandates 
 Grant conditions, both program specific and crosscutting 
 Total statutory preemption 
 Partial statutory preemption 
 Federal income tax provisions affecting state and local tax base 
 Regulatory actions taken by federal courts and agencies 
 Regulatory delays and non-enforcement 
 Federal exposure of state and local governments to liability lawsuits 
 
This coercive process discourages cooperation because it places public 
officials on the defensive and causes conflict that extends far beyond the specific 
mandates (Posner, 2007, pp. 402–404).  Clovis (2006, pp. 6–8), notes because 
of the national government’s expanding control, states are forced to utilize 
services and quality of life issues to compete for citizens. 
3. Competitive 
Considering the coercive environment created by the evolving power of 
the federal government, local governments compete for citizens through 
services; that is, they seek to provide services and a secure environment that 
cause citizens to choose one jurisdiction over another.  Such competition is 
necessary because citizens are closest to their local representatives.  While all 
elected officials are subject to being voted out of office, the close relationship 
between local officials and their constituency makes them more accountable to 
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the citizens, and easier to vote out office.  Therefore, states/localities seek to 
provide an environment that is responsive to the needs of its citizenry; a concept 
described as competitive federalism (Clovis, 2006, pp. 6–9).  Under this theory, 
no society can provide total security; therefore, priorities must be set, and  
citizens choose the jurisdiction that best addresses their needs (Nivola, 2002, p. 
1).  In addition, this approach encourages jurisdictions to pool resources and 
collaborate on security issues, as no single jurisdiction can do it all. 
Considering these concepts, the literature indicates federalism will 
continue to evolve as significant events impact the nation.  This evolution of 
federalism is similar to Bellavitas’s description of homeland security, in that the 
principals of federalism are largely based on disagreement for which the pursuit 
of a resolution is an evolutionary process (2008, p. 15).  Considering this 
process, a strong emphasis is needed at the state/local level, as it is the closest 
point between the citizens and their representatives.  However, the literature 
reflects a considerable gap between federal and local levels of government, as 
the role of the states has been minimized (Kettl, 2006).  This minimization erodes 
at the principles of federalism.  Interestingly, this minimization appears to be 
more of a practical practice, than a policy decision.  This is evident in “The 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” where it is reported: 
The system . . . reflects the American system of federalism, 
allocating roles and responsibilities between levels of government 
by utilizing a layered system that requires local governments to first 
request assistance from their State.  States, in turn, must use their 
own resources, if available, before requesting Federal assistance. 
(White House Office, 2006c, p. 72) 
While the written documents support the use of balanced principles of 
federalism, the practical application of these policies tends to confuse 
stakeholders.  Additionally, the literature is even less clear with regards to 
federalism’s role in the future.  One school of thought centers on an evolving 
concept of federalism, where the pendulum swings to a more powerful 
centralized national government following times of crisis.  As time passes, the 
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pendulum moves back from the extreme ends.  The other school of thought 
focuses more on rigid structure aimed at dictating the roles of the various levels 
of government.  This compilation of literature seeks to compartmentalize 
governmental functions and delegate responsibilities to states and localities 
(Newman, 2002, pp. 126–131).  
D. SUMMARY 
In an effort to help create new approaches to dealing with future threats to 
the homeland, this literature review examined the major works in three large 
categories: the definition of homeland security, federalism, and collaborative 
capacity, all of which are heavily influenced by human interaction.  These 
literature categories provide the basis for a better understanding of the nature of 
the governmental power—the environment in which homeland security 
stakeholders must function; a better understanding of what homeland security is 
to the various stakeholders; and success factors for working collaboratively in 
this complex enterprise. 
Overall, defining homeland security is complex and includes varying 
perspectives.  First, homeland security is primarily about national efforts to 
prevent terrorist attacks in the United States.  Second, there is no single 
homeland security definition; it is defined differently depending upon the 
circumstances and jurisdiction.  Third, homeland security is a compilation of 
competing interests and will evolve over time. 
With regards to federalism, one grouping of the literature indicates 
federalism will evolve as significant events impact the nation, while another group 
advocates structure, hierarchy, and delegation of responsibilities.  However, 
collectively the literature supports a future based on the foundations of federalism 
and balancing the needs of the nation with the civil liberties of its citizens. 
The literature surrounding the final category of collaborative capacity 
advocates building upon small, established relationships, where there is a history 
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of trust and working together.  These relationships provide the foundation for 
enhancing collaborative capacity and facilitating progress during challenging 
times.  However, the literature cautions that while collaboration is preferred, it 
must not be viewed as a panacea. 
These three groups of literature support an evolving future.  That is, the 
literature establishes a basis for understanding how it is that homeland security 
stakeholders find themselves wondering where they fit in the homeland security 
enterprise, and it provides support for comprehensive enhancements that will 
promote growth and learning within the enterprise.  It is anticipated that such 
growth and learning (evolution) will lead to a nation better prepared to deal with 
future threats. 
Generally, efforts to produce rigidity and structure seem to encourage 
disagreement and discourage collaboration; however, some circumstances may 
warrant structure.  Bellavita argues an absence of agreement is often the catalyst 
for continued evolution (2008, p. 16).  A similar nexus was discovered when 
examining the literature on federalism.  The increased coercive power of the 
federal government (coercive federalism) encourages competition and 
disconnect between the various levels of government.  Because state and local 
governments compete for citizens (competitive federalism) by providing the 
desired services, citizens are forced choose one jurisdiction over another.  This 
competition likely results in further disagreement, which leads to an evolutionary 
outcome that may be positive in some instances and negative in others.  Lastly, 
the literature supports an evolutionary process for enhancing collaborative 
capacity by working through conflict with a bottom-up philosophy of building 
large-scale collaboration from small trustful relationships. 
Collectively, the literature reflects that shaping the future of homeland 
security involves enhancing stakeholder collaboration through a common goal or 
ideology grounded in the principles of federalism.  However, the underlying 
theme seems to indicate that any strategy or plan for the future must consider the  
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significance of flexibility and evolution, as the homeland security enterprise is 
comprised of human beings that often choose their own competing interest over 
the grand ideology. 
The Gilmore Commission (2003, p. 1) notes that terrorism will not 
disappear. Therefore, the entire homeland security enterprise must work 
together, as a nation failing to work collectively and innovate may find itself like 
the once all-powerful dinosaurs—extinct (Sagarin, 2003, p. 2). 
E. WHAT IS MISSING? 
The remainder of this thesis will seek to add value to this compilation of 
literature, as it appears to be missing specific recommendations for enhancing 
cooperation and collaboration in the unique and complex world of homeland 
security.  Additionally, the literature appears to reflect an either or approach to 
structure within homeland security.  As noted in the argument, the future may lie 
in between; a hybrid approach where some aspects are structured and others 
decentralized, thereby providing some sense of order to a decentralized, but 
interdependent enterprise.  It is anticipated that such an approach will result in 
the synergy that will evolve enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares 
the nature for the uncertainties of the future. 
The goal of this thesis is to promote an understanding of where homeland 
security stakeholders fit in the homeland security enterprise.  It is anticipated that 
if the various components of the homeland security enterprise understand their 
roles and contributions, then they will be empowered to direct their energy 
towards promoting the positives and reducing the negatives; thus, collaboratively 
enhancing the enterprise towards the Gilmore Commission’s (2003) new 
normalcy. 
To this point, stakeholder frustrations reflect considerable disconnect 
within the homeland security enterprise.  State and local officials report the need 
to address problems unique to there respective jurisdictions. Literature 
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surrounding defining homeland security, understanding federalism, and 
enhancing collaborative capacity were examined to provide the foundation and 
capacity to offer recommendations for increasing the positives and decreasing 
the negatives throughout the enterprise.  The next chapter examines the 
selection and feedback from study participants to identify specific 
concerns/issues in an effort to offer comprehensive recommendations applicable 
across the homeland security enterprise. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Search men’s governing principles, and consider the wise, what 
they shun and what they cleave to.  
Marcus Aurelius (121-180) 
A. RESEARCH SCOPE 
It is widely accepted that protecting the American people is a responsibility 
to be shared across the nation. This shared responsibility presents many 
challenges ranging from human conflict to organizational structure.  As previously 
reported, the research reflects a homeland security enterprise suffering from a 
lack of trust, fragmented communications, and inadequate funding mechanisms.  
To date, much of the applicable research offers a reflective perspective on 
historical mistakes, or merely “admires the problem” (Gerencser, Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 19).  While this is certainly an important component, 
as one must build on lessons learned, this perspective offers little in proactively 
shaping the nation’s ability to effectively navigate the uncertain future.  This is in 
large part due to the myriad of homeland security influences and the fact that 
traditional approaches cause corrective action to be taken largely in an effort to 
prevent a reoccurrence of a specific undesired outcome. 
Therefore, this study examines the views and perspectives of current 
homeland security practitioners at four levels of government: local, state, 
regional, and federal.  It is narrowly designed to glean insight into the manner in 
which these individuals assess an evolving crisis, as well as their perspective of 
the others’ abilities.  The term perspective lends itself to emotion and subjectivity, 
which are significant, as these elements are frequently involved in matters of 
trust, which the literature asserts is essential to building collaborative capacity.  It 
is theorized that enhancing collaborative capacity will result in a resilient and 
evolving enterprise capable of effectively dealing with uncertainty.  
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B. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Considering the complexities of this evolving environment, this study was 
conducted utilizing a hybrid methodology involving an examination of literature, 
published reports and studies, and focus group feedback.  This research strategy 
was selected due to the two major themes of the author’s argument.  First, 
decentralize homeland security’s operational components; that is, give localities 
the flexibility and autonomy to address their unique homeland security needs in a 
manner consistent with national goals and objectives. Second, 
centralize/consolidate intelligence functions to facilitate situational awareness 
and free-flow of timely and accurate intelligence. A study of 
consolidating/centralizing intelligence seems best served by examining existing 
successes and challenges of another intelligence community.  Such an analysis 
addresses the key aspects of the author’s argument and is detailed in Chapter 
VI. This particular section will focus on feedback from participants with 
established equity in homeland security at each level of government. 
This study was conducted in a manner to reflect the author’s ability to 
provide comprehensive and informed recommendations about enhancing the 
future of homeland security.  Eight research participants with a true capacity to 
comment on the positive and negative elements of their respective homeland 
security environment were selected to add present-day value to this study.  The 
participants selected for this study consisted of the following: 
 
 Two local police executives, one of which is a municipal police 
chief.  Each local participant has in excess of 20 years of law 
enforcement experience and has coordinated numerous large-scale 
events requiring the coordination of multiple agencies, one of which 
when was a tornado that ripped through a metropolitan area at the 
height of rush-hour. 
 Each of the two state representatives has worked closely with 
Virginia’s Office of Commonwealth Preparedness and served as 
the Virginia State Police’s Homeland Security Coordinator. One 
representative has 26 years of service and the other, 15.  Their 
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work has involved cross-discipline coordination with agencies at all  
levels of government including the Strategic National Stockpile, 
weapons of mass destruction response, and Pandemic flu 
coordination and response. 
 Each of the two regional participants represented different agencies 
in the National Capital Region.  These individuals both have in 
excess of 20 years of law enforcement experience and have been 
involved in numerous significant incidents, including responding to 
and coordinating events at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 
 Each of the two federal participants represents national law 
enforcement agencies and each have in excess of 20 years of 
service.  Both have considerable experience in inter-agency 
coordination, and both have worked in and around major 
metropolitan areas for the majority of their careers.  Both have 
expert knowledge in weapons of mass destruction, national incident 
management, and terrorism response/investigations. 
 
In addition to the electronic interview, each participant was afforded an 
opportunity to provide additional input regarding the research process and/or 
matters not thoroughly exposed in the interview.  The identity of these individuals 
remains anonymous in accordance with the academic policies of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s IRB Process.  Anonymity was essential in order to ensure 
that the participants were comfortable discussing issues/concerns surrounding 
the complexities of the homeland security enterprise.  Absent this arrangement, it 
is highly probable that the participants would have been less willing to participate 
in this study. 
Interviews were constructed in a manner to assess participants’ responses 
to a given critical incident involving collaboration among the various homeland 
security stakeholders. Additionally, the feedback sought to identify the 
expectations of the various participants, their confidence in one another, and 
their views on what is working well and what needs to be improved in homeland 
security. The apparent subjectivity of the participants’ responses is 
acknowledged and viewed as valuable to the research process.  Such responses 
reflect the nuances of the various relationships that positively and negatively 
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influence the homeland security enterprise.  Additionally, the responses serve to 
identify gaps in the actual and expected outcomes of various stakeholders.  
Ignoring these complexities would be irresponsible and would likely result in 
recommendations doomed to fail, as they would be blindly implemented in a 
unknown environment.  
At a macro level, the goal was to examine the interaction among the 
various levels of government within the given scenario, while simultaneously 
identifying the positives and negatives affecting the capacity for enhanced 
collaboration.  Readers of this study may notice a limited number of participants; 
two law enforcement executives from each level of government.  This sampling 
pool was purposefully selected for their considerable knowledge, experience, and 
understanding of the dynamics and entirety of their respective level of 
government.  In addition to the number of participants, the particular discipline of 
law enforcement is itself, a small sampling of the overall homeland security 
enterprise.  However, the emphasis of this study is not the discipline of law 
enforcement, right or wrong actions, or an evaluation of resource deployment.  
Instead, emphasis is placed on the interaction between the various levels of 
government to identify potential gaps in the homeland security enterprise that 
draws attention to positive and negative influences.  The human and social 
components of the research support the use of inductive reasoning to identify 
commonality and differences among the responses in an effort to make 
recommendations that have applicability across the enterprise. 
It is anticipated that this study will produce areas for additional research.  
The reader is encouraged to explore these new areas and build upon this study 
in an effort that the improvements enhance the nation’s ability to effectively meet 
and exceed the demands of an uncertain future.  These areas of additional 
research are identified in Chapter VII. 
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C. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Participants of this study were asked to respond to a series of questions 
relating to two specific scenarios each with subsequent injects. The 
questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix B of this document.  Following each 
scenario, a Likert Scale was used to assess the degree to which each participant 
agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about interagency collaborations 
as related to the respective scenario.  Participant responses were recorded on a 
scale ranging from one to five, with five representing a strong agreement with the 
statement and one representing strong disagreement.  This scale was selected 
for its accuracy and ability to “Measure attitudes and other factors” when 
responding to a series of statements (Intelligent Measurement, 2007, p. 1).  The 
last section of the interview included general homeland security questions and an 
assessment of the participant’s level of confidence with the other levels of 
government.  The subsequent paragraphs identify the key findings of the study, 
while many of the specific narrative comments are to be incorporated throughout 
the remainder of this thesis document. 
 
Note: During the collection of data for this particular thesis, the willingness 
of state and local participants was clearly evident, as they were eager to offer 
candid comments and completed the electronic interviews is a timely manner.  
Contrarily, numerous attempts to secure more than a single regional participant 
willing to provide an interview failed.  Additionally, despite discussing the 
scenarios and federal responses, one federal executive opted out of the survey 
at the last minute, noting his respective agency’s legal department prohibited him 
from completing the questionnaire.  It would be very easy for the author to draw 
conclusions from this reluctance to participate.  At the very least, such reluctance 
may be indicative of the problem; that is, if stakeholders are not willing to 
candidly discuss the problems, how can the causative factors be understood and 
the homeland security enterprise enhanced.  Nevertheless, the author was able 
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to glean specific insight into both regional and federal positions from the two 
interviews returned, as well as from telephonic conversations with the two 
reluctant participants. 
1. Scenario One  
Intelligence feeds indicate with high certainty that a small group 
acquired explosives and planned to detonate a device near a large 
metropolitan area in Virginia.  Intelligence indicates the group will 
use a rental van to move the device into the center of the 
respective metropolitan area. 
Inject: Undetected, the device detonates at metropolitan’s center.  
Most buildings within 3,200 feet of the device are destroyed and/or 
severely damaged.  Injuries and deaths are substantial. 
Of significance in this scenario was that each level (of government) 
indicated that their role during this scenario was assisting and/or working in 
conjunction with other agencies.  However, local and state levels expressed 
great concern about interagency cooperation and communication.  Interestingly, 
locals were most concerned about the disconnect between the local and federal 
levels and did not mention state involvement at all.  On the other hand, state 
participants noted serious concerns that localities would resist their assistance 
and, therefore, fail to act in a timely manner.  Additionally, when asked what level 
of government was in charge at the scene, all levels reported that the federal 
level was in charge.  However, the federal level reported a unified command 
would be utilized to manage the scene.  These responses reflect uncertainty with 
regards to each level of government’s place in the scenario and tremendous 
skepticism of the other.  This appears to reflect a lack of confidence and trust. 
Regarding the statements of confidence following this scenario, each level 
appeared to be fairly confident in their own ability to fulfill their role in this 
scenario.  However, the federal level reported great concern with the quality of 
training of the other responders, while the local level expressed concern over the 
level of competency of the other responders.  When asked about the degree of 
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preparedness, the regional and federal levels reported a high level of 
preparedness for this type of situation.  As for collaboration and understanding 
one’s role during the scenario, states reported the least confidence in everyone’s 
ability to collaborate effectively with little conflict, and both local and state 
reported concerns in understanding one’s role during the scenario.  
Again, these responses appear to indicate a lack of confidence and trust, 
primarily at the state and local levels.  However, the regional and federal levels 
seem to indicate greater confidence in cross-collaboration. 
2. Scenario Two 
You receive a citizen report of an unusual situation.  The citizen 
reports seeing a truck driving through the streets of a densely 
populated area while spraying something from a cylinder into the 
air.  Local police respond and locate the abandoned truck, which 
appears to have completely disbursed the substance.  Intelligence 
and initial investigation indicate the substance may be hazardous.  
Inject: Further investigation reveals the substance is aerosolized 
anthrax and several first responders and citizens have been 
exposed. 
As with the first scenario, there was an apparent confusion with each 
level’s role during the scenario; however, each level eventually yielded control to 
the federal level.  Initially, both the federal and local levels reported being the 
primary agency, while state and regional immediately assumed a supportive 
and/or collaborative position.  Of great significance were the responses to “What 
if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other homeland security 
stakeholders?”  Each level of government reported concerns over possible 
inactivity by the others, uncertainty about the willingness to cooperate, poor 
communications, a failure of some to accept assistance before it is too late, and 
inappropriate information dissemination.  Other noteworthy areas centered on 
local concerns for sustainability and inadequate communications and state 
concerns with in improper handling of incident management, including not being 
equipped to effectively deal with weaponized anthrax.  
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Regarding the statements of confidence following this scenario, each level 
again appeared to be fairly confident in their own ability to fulfill their role in this 
scenario. (This contradicts earlier state comments of inadequate equipment for a 
weaponized anthrax response and handling). With regards to appropriate 
polices, strategies, and guidelines to effectively deal with this scenario, the local 
level expressed the greatest concern, while the federal level was most confident.  
Both local and state expressed concern about being prepared for this type of 
scenario; and as for collaboration, regional reflected the highest degree of 
confidence in the responders’ ability to work together with little conflict.  It is 
anticipated that this is in large part because the regional concept is itself 
collaborative in nature. 
3. General Questions 
In addressing the general questions, many of the trends already discussed 
were repeated. Of significance was local concern over not receiving adequate 
information, the need to address local issues, and the potential for conflict 
between local and federal levels.  State level is concerned about inter-agency 
cooperation, limited training and experience, and a lack of homeland security 
leadership.  Regional level reported no specific concerns, while the federal level 
reported the positive relationships formed from the Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTF). The federal level expressed concern over appropriate information 
sharing and guarding against complacency.  Overall, each level of government 
acknowledged that homeland security is everyone’s concern. 
The subsequent confidence scale reflected that the state is most 
concerned about the capabilities and response of the local and regional levels.  
However, all levels are generally confident in the capabilities of the federal 
response.  With the exception of the state responses, all others reflected a 




governments.  This neutral position may be caused by a sense of political 
correctness or is a result of a knowledge gap associated with the capabilities of 
the various stakeholders. 
D. SUMMARY 
The preceding paragraphs framed the scenarios and identified several 
points of interest. Collectively, the interview responses identified concerns 
involving uncertainty about roles during a major incident, inadequate information 
sharing, multiple roles, and interpersonal conflicts.  These reflect low levels of 
trust and capacity to collaborate.  
Contrarily, the interviews reflected positives with regards to the level of 
confidence in the respective level of government’s own capabilities.  Additionally, 
governments generally feel they are more prepared now than a few years earlier, 
and all participants unanimously believe homeland security is everyone’s 
responsibility.  
These observations are similar to those expressed by homeland security 
stakeholders nationwide, as articulated throughout this thesis.  For example: 
 
 I have a healthy respect for the federal government and the 
importance of keeping this nation safe. . . . But I also live every day 
as a police chief in an American city where violence every day is 
not foreign and is not anonymous but is right out there in the 
neighborhoods (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1). 
 More openly than at any time since the Sept. 11 attacks, local 
authorities have begun to complain that the federal financing for 
domestic security is being too closely tied to combating potential 
terrorist threats, at a time when they say they have more urgent 
priorities (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1) 
 There is uneven coordination . . . among State and local 
governments. For example, our States and territories developed 
fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-
threat, high-density urban areas (White House Office, 2006c, p. 
67).   
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These statements, along with the literature, reports, and studies 
reasonably support the thesis findings correlation across the homeland security 
enterprise.  Additionally, more detailed participant responses are to be 
incorporated throughout the thesis reflecting applicability with the respective 
literature and the nation as a whole. 
E. MOVING FORWARD—CHAPTERS 
The research objective is to provide recommendations to reduce the 
negatives and enhance the positives in a manner that will offer a new path 
forward and improve the overall homeland security enterprise thereby, helping to 
understand where the various components all fit.  The subsequent chapters will 
address the participants’ feedback by exploring the potential causative factors in 
an effort to bridge the gaps identified and offer recommendations for the future. 
As noted in the argument and supported by the author’s research, 
significant gaps exist in collaboration and information flow.  It is believed that the 
current DHS grant process erodes at collaborative efforts by injecting high levels 
of competition between jurisdictions, as well minimizing the roles of the states.  
This dynamic was identified by one state participant during the research, and it 
appears to add further conflict to an already complex environment.   
To this point, this study identified many of the problems/concerns 
associated with the ambiguity of the homeland security enterprise.  Seeking to 
establish a capacity for addressing these problems/concerns, applicable 
literature was examined in the areas of defining homeland security, enhancing 
collaborative capacity, and understanding the role of federalism.  This section, 
examined the views and perspectives of current homeland security practitioners 
at four levels of government: local, state, regional, and federal to glean insight 
into specific concerns surrounding the interaction of the various levels of 
government during an evolving critical incident.  Moving ahead, the subsequent 
chapters will address the following areas: 
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 Building collaborative capacity 
 Promoting collaboration through an enhanced DHS grant process 
 Improving information/intelligence flow 
 
The next chapter, Building Collaborative Capacity, addresses a bottom-up 
philosophy of enhancing collaborations from small trustful relationships.  This is 
important, as it is the foundation of support for both a decentralized grant process 
and a more organized/structured information flow. 
This study will conclude with specific recommendations to enhance the 
positives, and minimize the negatives in an effort to promote a more efficient, 
effective, and prepared homeland security enterprise, thereby helping to answer 
the question, “Where do we fit in the homeland security enterprise?” 
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IV. BUILDING COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
Error is the force that welds men together; truth is communicated to 
men only by deeds of truth 
Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) 
A. COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
As noted during the interviews and existing research, the entire nation 
must collaborate and share in the responsibility of homeland security (U.S. Office 
of Homeland Security, 2002).  However, such collaboration is complicated by 
challenges created from various organizational cultures, demands on resources, 
and motivations. These complexities often function as disincentives to 
cooperation and collaboration (Temple, 2007).  These barriers are evident in the 
interview responses, where one local participant wrote that he is “Concerned 
about potential inactivity of federal agencies” (Interviews, 2009).  Additionally, he 
commented that he is “Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. It 
is apparent that many Federal agencies are inefficient, have communication 
issues, and often times do not play well with each other” (Interviews, 2009).  This 
section will focus on overcoming the barriers to collaboration by building upon 
small trustful relationships. 
Initially, it was thought that the Department of Homeland Security would 
provide a direct opportunity for localities to engage with the federal government, 
thus, changing the government’s organizational culture and eliminating many of 
the prior complications and frustrations noted above (Wortzel, 2003).  However, 
after six years, “We have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to 
multiple homeland security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended 
and unintended consequences” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 4). 
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Integration, 
Management, and Oversight, Representative Mike Rogers stated, “I think there is 
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an integration problem among the agencies. I think there is a glaring problem of 
inadequate integration between the Homeland and the states and the local 
governments” (House Committee on Homeland Security, 2005, p. 65).  Two 
years after Rogers’s testimony, it is apparent that such problems still exists, as 
noted throughout the interviews conducted for this thesis: 
 
 Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies. 
 Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. 
 It is apparent that many federal agencies are inefficient, have 
communication issues, and often times do not play well with each 
other. 
 Concerned local agencies would resist the immediate assistance 
being offered by the state and federal agencies. (Interviews, 2009) 
 
It is clear that considerable gaps exist among the various homeland 
security stakeholders; this discourages them from working together as a team 
across organizational boundaries.   
The 2008 National Response Framework and the 2007 National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, both support a homeland security definition that 
addresses all-hazards.  These documents guide much of the nation’s homeland 
security efforts. Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
embraces the all-hazards definition; it provides guidance for national 
preparedness.  The all-hazards approach is largely based on the philosophy that 
the items and skills needed to address most emergencies are similar to those 
needed to prepare for and respond to terrorism (Bellavita, 2008). This all-hazards 
concept involves a compilation of the various homeland security interests, which 
appears to cause individual jurisdictions to seek to advance their respective 
interest, thus promoting competition. Such competition likely discourages 
collaboration, thereby causing some to focus inward on their respective 
jurisdictions.  This seems dangerous and counterproductive: 
 37
It’s a mistake to think that any single agency [and/or jurisdiction] 
could completely fulfill the required roles.  Indeed, for any complex 
situation anywhere in the world, it’s become obvious that there is no 
one authority . . . that can single handedly save the day. 
(Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 26) 
Therefore, jurisdictions must seek to enhance their collaborative capacity 
in an effort to jointly address future challenges.  As used, collaborative capacity is 
the product of “Such components as trust, communication, intellectual capital, 
creative opportunity, acceptance of leadership and learning . . . with the ability to 
learn being the most important” (Getha–Taylor, 2008, p. 126). 
Collaboration is clearly a necessary component of any future homeland 
security strategy.  Secretary Chertoff (2006) asserted the nation needed to 
reorient with urgency, flexibility, and resolve.  The essential aspect of his claim 
appears to be flexibility, as this supports an evolutionary process.  The nation 
must remain vigilant against complacency and seek to evolve continuously, as a 
failure to adapt to the changing environment may potentially lead to the nation’s 
demise.  According to Raphael Sagarin (2003, p. 3), “The planet’s diversity tells 
us that evolution works.  But the number of failed life forms is sobering.  Even the 
once dominant organisms such as dinosaurs could not avoid extinction.”   
To avoid similar circumstances the nation must capitalize on the synergy 
of collaborative initiatives, as collaboration among organizations is the most 
effective approach due to the complexity and scale of issues (Mattessich, 2005).  
In this case, synergy is the novel combined effect of interaction.  While there are 
several types of synergy, the focus here is that the positive, and often 
unintended, effects of collaboration are greater than that of a single homeland 
security stakeholder (Corning, 2007).  Mattessich (2005, p. 4) indicates 
successful collaboration is dependent upon a commitment to a “Definition of 
mutual relationships and goals; a jointly developed structure and shared 
responsibility; mutual authority and accountability for success; and sharing or 
resources and rewards.”  Furthermore, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 250) 
advocate the importance of trust, noting, “There is mounting evidence 
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demonstrating that where parties trust each other, they are more willing to 
engage in cooperative activity through which further trust may be generated.” 
According to the applicable literature, collaboration is mutually beneficial 
and leads to the achievement of common goals and rewards (Mattessich, 2005, 
p. 2).  Moreover, it is the “Most effective approach because of the complexity and 
scale of issues” (Mattessich, 2005, p. 2).  It is evident in the thesis interviews that 
jurisdictions see value in collaboration; one participant noted a desire for “Face-
to-face meetings quarterly to discuss past, present, and future issues” 
(Interviews, 2009).  By working together collaborative synergy will assist in 
dealing with the unanticipated challenges caused by an uncertain future 
(Moynihan, 2005; Murphy, 2006).   
However, effective collaboration often requires a loss of control, flexibility, 
and glory (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992).  These circumstances will ultimately 
produce conflict and many will seek to avoid such conflict, thereby sacrificing the 
benefits of synergy (Aamodt, 1999; Blumenthal, 1995).  This encourages dispute 
resolution through a political compromise, which causes a migration from the 
original collaborative goal (Blumenthal, 1995). Unfortunately, compelling 
organizations to cooperate is ineffective and leads to suspicion of one another by 
the affected partners (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). Interestingly, the thesis 
interviews reflected the greatest level of suspicion at the state and local levels.  
This may in part be due to the federal government’s efforts to compel or coerce 
cooperation through various mandates (Posner, 2007). This dynamic draws 
attention to the concept of coercive federalism, which is further exasperated by 
the various DHS grant requirements and mandates. This is discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
Considering these pros and cons of collaboration, efforts to enhance 
collaborative capacity must start at the microlevel; that is, individual relationships 
are at the core of larger inter-organizational collaborations.  Huxham and 
Macdonald (1992) indicate individuals develop trustful relationships that evolve 
and incorporate more people.  Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) further support 
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this concept in their book, The Starfish and the Spider. The authors note small 
individual relationships evolve collaborative capacity independently and in spite 
of a hierarchical structure.  To further enhance this capacity, a champion, or as 
Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) note, a catalyst, is necessary for such evolution 
to occur. Huxham and MacDonald (1992) caution that care must be taken to 
avoid presenting the champion as a power figure, as partners to the collaboration 
may view this person as a threat. Therefore, a small group of champions 
comprised of the significant partners will likely minimize the perceived threat and 
provide a sense of legitimacy to the collaboration. Brafman and Beckstrom 
(2006) offer a similar strategy but suggest the catalyst motivate the collaboration 
and then back away, thereby allowing capacity to build from within the 
group/community, and not around the catalyst. 
Nevertheless, building upon the established trust of a few, the collective 
leadership will serve as a collaborative model for the various partners.  It is 
important to note that the term leadership should not be interpreted as a means 
of creating command and control; the approach must truly reflect the interest of 
all stakeholders.  This approach to enhancing the collaborative capacity is 
consistent with Mattessich’s (2005) success factors: 
 
 Environment: By building upon small trustful relationships, a history 
of collaboration is established, which will serve to establish an 
environment where collaboration is expected. 
 Membership: By including the representation from all partners in 
the collaboration, and the significant partners in a group of 
collective champions, the stakeholders may be less threatened and 
feel included in the collaboration.  
 Process: “The task ahead is too formidable for any single 
institution” (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8).  Employing this 
concept as the guiding principle, allow the partners to understand 
the need and benefit of collaboration, thereby encouraging 
ownership.   
 Communication: The collective champions keep the larger group 
informed, which aids in Huxham’s and Macdonald’s (1992, p. 6) 
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active process philosophy by tipping the “Balance of pitfalls, 
advantages and disadvantages in favor of collaboration rather than 
individualism.”  
 Purpose: As with communication, the role of the champions is to 
guide the collaboration through uncertainty.  Although homeland 
security is filled with uncertainty, clear goals and objectives allow 
partners to compare the collaboration to expectations, thereby 
seeing the benefits of the relationship. 
 Resources: With skilled and vested champions, leadership 
legitimizes the collaboration and guides the collective group 
through the challenges of an uncertain future.  
 
The evaluation of literature indicates compelling collaboration is 
ineffective, as it leads to suspicion of one another by the affected partners 
(Huxham & Macdonald, 1992).  Such suspicion leads to conflict, which may 
“Keep people from working together . . . [and] lessen productivity” (Aamodt, 
1999, p. 515).  This conflict may potentially destroy the collaboration.  Therefore, 
enhancing collaborative capacity must evolve from the smallest level, in lieu of 
being mandated from the top of a hierarchical structure. 
B. CASE STUDY 
In evaluating this approach to enhancing collaborative capacity, the article 
“Government Agencies Build Stronger Foundations for Sharing Information” 
(2008, p. 1), is offered as a very brief case study or example of collaborative 
capacity at work.  The article acknowledges that while the benefits of information 
sharing are clearly evident, they are very difficult to achieve. However, 
“Collaboration with entities outside the government is becoming more feasible as 
easier-to-use collaboration platforms emerge” (“Government Agencies Build,” 
2008, p. 1). 
In this case, a small group within the trusted environment of Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), identified a problem regarding the lack of 
“Comprehensive visibility throughout the life of the case [criminal investigative 
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case] (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1).  Recognizing the need for a 
collaborative approach, the group championed this initiative and gathered 
information.  They explored potential solutions deciding “To automate processes 
within and across communities” (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1).  
Upon selection of a system integrator, the group tested their prototype with 
stakeholders, informing them of the process and communicating the purpose 
(Mattessich, 2005).  Understanding the challenges of this integration, the group 
sought a “Voice for a community . . . [which] required a lot of consensus building 
and policy knowledge” (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1). 
The group embraced this active and challenging process by 
communicating with the stakeholders and seeking as much commonality as 
possible in their model.  The process incorporated phased implementation with 
ongoing testing and feedback.  Through this integrative system: 
Case management has been created across five major user 
communities. The system also integrates multiple applications . . . 
In meeting those challenges, [Department of Navy Criminal Justice 
Information System] DONCJIS will achieve a sophisticated level of 
functionality that is difficult to attain but when successful, offers a 
high-value return (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1). 
That is, the stakeholders are able to clearly see the benefits of the 
collaboration. 
This brief analysis supports the evolution of small, trustful relationships as 
the means to enhancing collaborative capacity. The group, with a history of 
collaboration built upon the existence of trustful relationships—environment.  
They included representatives from entities affected by the relationship—
membership. They incorporated established processes and innovative 
technology that encouraged a model of commonality, which demonstrated how 
the stakeholders benefited from the collaboration—process.  The group of skilled 
leaders provided clear goals and objectives and provided continuous feedback—
communication, purpose, and resources.  This case study exemplifies how small 
bottom-up approaches effectively enhance collaborative capacity.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
Changing organizational philosophies and building trustful relationships 
are difficult, but necessary, as the thesis interviews clearly articulate significant 
barriers still interfere with collaborative efforts. The research discussed 
throughout this chapter supports a bottom-up approach based on small trustful  
relationships that evolve through the leadership that serves as a catalyst or 
champion for change. The research supports the following success factors for 
enhancing collaborative capacity: 
 
 As relationships are an evolutionary process, seek established 
relationships between individuals or small groups as a source for 
change.  These smaller collaborations likely include mechanisms 
for conflict resolution and trust necessary for the challenges of 
uncertainty. 
 Bring new members to the group who can contribute and add value 
to the desired goals and objectives.  This inclusive process will 
allow the group to grow its capacity, encourage ownership, and 
enhance the group’s synergy. 
 Have more than one champion.  This collective leadership will not 
only be a model for the collaboration, but it will minimize the 
perceived threat associated with a single position of power and 
provides legitimacy to the collaboration.  Consider the use of a 
catalyst to stimulate the collaboration and then back away. 
 Communicate, communicate, and communicate: informed 
stakeholders understand the process, where they fit, and what the 
collaboration seeks to achieve.  Embrace the concept: “The task 
ahead is too formidable for any single institution” (Klitgaard & 
Treverton, 2003, p. 8).  This will encourage stakeholders to engage 
and own the process. 
 
The collective research supports a homeland security future that involves 
a compilation of the various homeland security interests (Bellavita, 2008).  
Because of these varying and sometimes competing interests, enhancing the 
collaborative capacity is essential to overcome the complexity and scale of 
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issues (Mattessich, 2005).  The process of enhancing collaborative capacity is 
evolutionary and must grow from small trustful relationships/circles.  Raphael 
Sagarin (2003, p. 3) asserts, “The real challenge is to apply evolutionary thinking 
to homeland security in a more structured and broad-based manner.”  He 
indicates, “The United States is the most dominant presence on the Earth today, 
but terrorist networks such as al Qaeda represent a ruthless adversary.  
Terrorism poses an evolutionary challenge; it should be treated like one” 
(Sagarin, 2003, p. 3). 
However, the challenges are difficult, as stakeholders will lose 
independent control, flexibility, and glory (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992).  While 
these challenges are formidable, they are not insurmountable.  As a nation, it 
must not be allowed that “Our fears to blind us to the possibilities of excellence” 
(Quinn, 1996, p. 11). Collaboration is an empowering environment.  When 
engaged in this environment, “People are most likely to take risks, experience 
success, and then feel empowered themselves” (Quinn, 1996, p. 228).  
As evident from the thesis interviews, suspicion and distrust continues to 
be an issue across levels of government, which demonstrates the need for 
improvements.  Noting the value of collaboration, one state participant wrote:  
The overall objective is to establish positive working relationships in 
advance of “the real thing” so that when faced with a live event, 
incident managers will already be familiar . . . and will be more 
likely to work together to resolve an incident (Interviews, 2009). 
However, in order to positively influence the future, collaboration must 
extend beyond any single incident/project and become a normative behavior.  As 
with the NCIS case study, trustful collaborative relationships exist on small scales 
throughout the homeland security environment.  Cultivating and building upon 
these will enhance overall collaborative capacity. 
This approach to enhancing collaborative capacity supports an evolving 
homeland security definition that is comprised of a myriad of interconnected 
stakeholders.  Many of these stakeholders already have well-established 
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relationships that are the foundation for the future.  As they search for ways to 
make their communities and jurisdictions safer, while simultaneously respecting 
the concepts of federalism, they must be provided the tools and the autonomy to 
address their unique needs before it can be expected that they will more fully 
engage at a national level. 
The next chapter suggests an approach that seeks to create an 
environment that will further stimulate engagement at the lowest possible level.  
Using the same bottom-up philosophy discussed in this collaborative capacity 
section, it is anticipated that a decentralize DHS grant process will provide the 
funding and autonomy that will stimulate growth and evolution from the bottom of 
the homeland security enterprise. 
In Ed Kenerson’s (2008, p. 13) book, The Cabin in the Woods, he reminds 
the reader, “Change is never optional . . . but, growth always is.”  As homeland 
security stakeholders seek to build a better future, they must never forget that 
“The foundation is the most important part” (Kenerson, 2008, p. 40).  That is, the 
bottom of the homeland security enterprise must be solid before it can be 
expected that changes to other aspects of the enterprise to withstand the 
challenges of an uncertain future. 
 45
V. COLLABORATION THROUGH AN ENHANCED DHS GRANT 
PROCESS 
Some strange thoughts transcend our wonted themes, And into 
glory peep. 
Henry Vaughan (1622–1695) 
As evident from the previous chapter, collaboration is best enhanced in 
trustful environments, where small groups or circles develop close bonds.  These 
circles then evolve as trust and interdependence grow.  Additionally, the concept 
of cooperative federalism provides that each jurisdiction is responsible for 
providing the necessary goods and services for its citizens; security is among the 
essential services.  As mentioned previously, jurisdictions currently compete with 
each other for homeland security funding.  This competition appears to promote 
distrust and isolationism, as each jurisdiction seeks to demonstrate a greater 
need than the other stakeholders.  This seems to encourage jurisdictions to look 
inward to justify and/or support their declaration of need.  Therefore, the existing 
approach seems to function as a disincentive cooperation, collaboration, and 
integration. 
This section seeks to demonstrate that consolidating grants with similar 
goals and objects and administering them to state and local jurisdictions in a 
block-grant format will greatly reduce competition.  Additionally, it is anticipated 
that this approach will allow jurisdictions to address their unique needs and then 
begin to look outward in an effort to enhance the overall homeland security 
enterprise. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security features an all-hazards 
approach to national security. Carafano (2008, p. 2) notes localities must sustain 
independent operations for at least the first 72 hours. This indicates 
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states/localities must be thoroughly prepared for nearly everything.  To address 
state/local preparedness, DHS leverages control through a series of top-down 
mandates. For example, a recent mandate caused localities to establish a 
capability to guard against improvised explosive devices, regardless of their 
current capacity (U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1).  Such 
mandates trigger frustration and confusion, as localities feel the federal 
government is not listening to their concerns, yet continue to force them to spend 
dollars on vague threats (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, pp. 1–2).  However, this 
coercive approach is not limited to homeland security.  The following are 
examples of other controlling mandates: 
 
 A requirement for states to collect data on sex offenders including 
DNA samples and to prepare a statewide sex offender registry 
database (PL109-299), as a condition attached to receipt of federal 
law enforcement grants. No appropriations have yet been provided 
to cover what CBO estimates to be costs of $60 million over a five-
year period. 
 Prohibition against using federal grant funds for projects where 
eminent domain is employed to support private use, a response to 
the Supreme Court's decision in the KeIo case where the use of 
eminent domain for such purposes was ruled constitutional.10 The 
provision was contained in an FY 2006 appropriations act (PL 109-
115) 11. 
 Federal standards requiring state and local governments using 
federal foster care funds to visit foster care children monthly (PL 
109-299). 
 Prohibition of state and local lawsuits against manufacturers or 
sellers of firearms (PL 109-92). 
 Institution of a requirement for states to hold special elections when 
continuity of government is jeopardized by a national emergency, 
necessitating some states to amend their constitutions (PL 109-55). 
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 Preemption of state authority governing citing of certain 
transmission lines, and citing and operation of onshore liquefied 
natural gas facilities, energy efficiency, safety of nuclear facilities, 
and the reliability of electric services (PL 109-58). (Posner, 2007, p. 
399) 
 
Collectively, these mandates represent an institutionalized approach 
deemed coercive federalism by Samuel Clovis (2006).  This dynamic erodes at 
the efforts to promote cooperation and collaboration across the various levels of 
government, as the mandates force states/localities to compete against other 
jurisdictions for the funding.  Additionally, the mandates cause the respective 
jurisdiction to apply the funding in accordance with the various mandates, 
thereby potentially neglecting other significant needs. 
Nevertheless, states/localities depend on DHS grant funding to offset 
homeland security spending and, therefore, are compelled to comply with grant 
requirements in order to receive the funding.  As noted, this appears to be a 
counterproductive strategy and adds to state/local frustrations.   
This chapter addresses these frustrations and congressional concerns 
that grant funding is out of control by exploring the value of consolidating federal 
grant programs through the use of federal block grants.  It is anticipated that 
doing so will shift primary authority and responsibility to state and locals in an 
effort to “Facilitate accountability for national goals and objectives” (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  This approach is consistent with Sagarin’s 
(2003) assertion that broad-based thinking must be applied to homeland security.  
Grant consolidation appears to employ such a broad-based approach and 
provides the flexibility necessary to address the unique needs of the respective 
jurisdiction.  By allowing state/local governments to address their specific needs, 
it is expected that security is enhanced from the bottom-up and the overall 
homeland security enterprise is positively influenced.  Furthermore, jurisdictions, 
when not competing against one another, will likely be more inclined to work 
together and overcome some of the disconnect noted in the interviews conducted 
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for this thesis.  Consider the comment by a local participant during the interviews 
for this thesis; “Locals and Feds would be well served to form and enhance the 
personal relationships between the two groups” (Interviews, 2009). 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
According to a report release by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), “Presidential directives instruct the DHS to develop a national all-hazards 
approach—preparing all sectors of society for any emergency event including 
terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters” (2005, p. 2).  It is accepted 
that “First responders have the lead responsibility for carrying out emergency 
management efforts” (Government Accountability Office, 2005, p. 11).  Initially, it 
was thought the DHS would provide a direct opportunity for localities to engage 
with the federal government, thus, changing the government’s organizational 
culture and eliminating many of the prior complications and frustrations (Wortzel, 
2003, p. 5).  However, after six years, people and organizations continue to 
merely react to the myriad of homeland security decisions (Bellavita, 2006). 
Following September 11, 2001, homeland security dollars went largely to 
offset existing gaps in first responder capabilities.  The DHS funding formulas 
resulted in disproportionate allocations.  For example, “Wyoming received $10 
per capita from DHS for emergency preparedness while New York, much more 
likely to be a target, received just $1.40” (O’Hanlon, 2005, p. 3).  This problem 
was somewhat corrected in the 2005 budget by allocating a larger percentage of 
the funding to high profile cities.  However, outside the “Urban Area Security 
Initiative, (UASI) other funds are still allocated by non-threat based criteria that 
favor states of low population density” (O’Hanlon, 2005, p. 3).   
In these difficult financial times, local agencies are experiencing a growing 
frustration, as their resources dwindle, while terrorism responsibilities increase.  
They face continuous cuts in federal funding despite the fact that the majority of 
Americans believe violent crime is a bigger threat than a potential terrorist attack 
(Biden, 2008, pp. 1–3).  According to Schmitt and Johnston (2008, p. 1):  
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More openly than at any time since the Sept. 11 attacks, local 
authorities have begun to complain that the federal financing for 
domestic security is being too closely tied to combating potential 
terrorist threats, at a time when they say they have more urgent 
priorities. 
This perpetual drain on resources and the federal government’s failure to 
listen to local concerns is frustrating localities and causing them to be confused 
about their place in the homeland security enterprise (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, 
pp. 1–2). 
In the 1980s, crime rates soared.  Recognizing crime as a local problem, 
unique to the respective jurisdiction, the federal government supported localities 
through federal block-grants/COP funds.  According to a 2005 GAO report, these 
block grants contributed to the decline in crime rates.  In addition, President Bush 
recognized the value of block grants when he proposed, “Converting a wide 
range of federal programs into block grants” (Finegold, Wherry, & Schardin, 
2004, p. 1).  Block grants provide a fixed sum of money to a jurisdiction with 
reduced federal oversight; thus providing the jurisdiction with the flexibility and 
autonomy to address jurisdiction specific problems. 
Despite the success of block-grant programs, the current homeland 
security funding mechanism does not allow for this style of grant funding.  The 
current approach to homeland security funding allows local governments to offset 
some of their homeland security costs.  As noted in the interview documents, one 
local (2009) participant said, “The level of preparation far exceeds what it was 
even a few short years ago. Though not what it should be, progress is being 
made.”  In addition, Gwen Holden (2003) asserts these resources enable local 
governments to develop advanced levels of preparedness.  Some localities 
indicate federal programs have assisted with “Bringing together multi-disciplinary 
teams at local, county, and State levels; thereby, improving their all-hazards 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], 2009). 
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However, critics argue despite the successes, the burden and costs of 
maintaining these efforts ultimately falls back onto the localities (Holden, 2003). 
This is especially burdensome, as localities are forced to focus on “Maintaining 
local services” (Interviews, 2009) in addition to their homeland security 
obligations. This is further compounded by the statutory requirements that 
dramatically limit the use of funding and slow the availability of grant funds 
(FEMA, 2009).  Additionally, the competing interests of the various stakeholders 
complicate the grant process and encourage jurisdictions to write harder in their 
effort to acquire the grant funding (Bellavita, 2008).  This arduous process 
creates “administrative and operational burdens that can defer other state and 
local preparedness priorities” (FEMA, 2009, p. 22). 
Although frustrating, the federal government cautions that the grant funds 
are not entitlements, as the ultimate goal of the grant program is to integrate local 
assets into a national preparedness and response system (Carafano, 2006).  
Many in congress believe it is time for DHS grants to be eliminated and or 
reduced considerably, as “It is far from clear that the billions spent on homeland 
security grants since 9/11 has been well spent” (Carafano, 2006, p. 1).  Many 
assert the DHS grants have become pork barrel funding, which has contributed 
little to national security (Carafano, 2006). 
However, talk of eliminating the grants may further discourage the 
integration of local and state assets into the national system, as localities/states 
will not be able to sustain their assets without federal support.  According to 
Carafano (2006), “Grants should be used to support these missions.”  DHS has 
developed a comprehensive approach to spending in an effort to meet federal 
priorities and abandoning this process may cause jurisdictions with the highest 
priorities to lose funding to jurisdictions with lower threat concerns (Carafano, 
2006). 
Considering these complexities, it is apparent that localities/states “Have 
unique knowledge of conditions and relationships in their jurisdictions that can 
significantly add to the planning and accomplishment of preparedness activities” 
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(FEMA, 2009, p. 19). Therefore, they are best suited to apply funding 
accordingly, as localities/states are in the best position to address events at the 
local level.  This concept is consistent with Clovis’s (2006) discussion of 
collaborative and competitive federalism. Additionally, localities/states recognize 
many federal grants are “similar in desired outcomes, [and therefore recommend] 
. . . consolidation of grants with similar objectives and outcomes” (FEMA, 2009, 
p. 22).  Such consolidation will likely serve to streamline the process and 
expedite funding directly to the specific problems.   
Contrarily, experience suggests localities/states vary significantly, which 
complicates data collection and accountability. Therefore, some federal 
involvement is necessary to effectively monitor a consolidated process (Finegold 
et al., 2004).  Also, critics may assert that if left up to the localities/states, the lack 
of accountability and strict federal oversight will cause a misuse of grant funds 
and a failure to properly prepare.  This thought process supports the concept that 
homeland security is a national problem to be addressed through a single 
homeland security definition and hierarchical control.  However, the vast majority 
of the literature is contrary to this position and is further supported by 
participants’ interview feedback, where it is apparent that homeland security is 
not viewed as linear and hierarchical; instead, it is viewed more as a 
collaborative effort with input and support from all stakeholders.  When asked 
who is responsible for homeland security, respondents unanimously asserted 
that homeland security is everyone’s responsibility (Interviews, 2009). 
C. IMPACT 
Considering that “There are some 89,000 jurisdictions below the national 
level” (Clovis, 2006, p. 11), it is reasonable to expect each locality to have a 
significant say in addressing homeland security needs unique to the respective 
jurisdiction.  This concept allows homeland security to evolve from the bottom-up 
as new challenges develop.   
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The current “Federal grant system for first responders is highly 
fragmented, which can complicate coordination and integration of services and 
planning at state and local levels” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  
A consolidation of federal grants into block grants provides flexibility to address 
jurisdiction specific needs, and with properly designed oversight, facilitates efforts 
in the direction of national goals and objectives.  Currently, block grants are used 
for “Welfare reform, community development, social services, law enforcement, 
public health, and education” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 11).  It 
is anticipate that block grants, with appropriate oversight, will allocate funding to 
states/localities with the greatest need and create a balance between 
accountability and flexibility. 
Considering this approach, it is reasonable to expect pushback from some 
homeland security stakeholders as the impact of this approach transfers 
responsibility and accountability largely to the state/local level.  For example, 
local government makeup may cause funds to be allocated disproportionately to 
the various stakeholders.  That is, under the block-grant approach, law 
enforcement may receive funding in lieu of, or at a disproportionate rate, than 
public health.  Additionally, this process potentially causes local politics to 
become a force in funding allocation, whereas the current system “Generally 
call[s] for Congress to make a fundamental decision about where power and 
authority to make decisions should rest in our federal system for a particular 
program area” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  Another impact 
consideration centers on the suspicion that localities would use block grants as a 
“Replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly referred to 
as supplantation (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  This issue is of 
significant concern because supplantation potentially undermines the integrity of 
the process and may cause the locality to be underprepared for threats to the 
homeland.  Therefore, a quality oversight process is essential to the success of 
this endeavor.  To address this criticism, a comprehensive oversight committee 
should be established with representation from all stakeholders.  Such a 
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committee will promote ownership in the process, as well as to ensure allocations 
are made to the areas of greatest need and in a manner consistent with national 
goals and objectives.  These elements are consistent with several of Mattessich’s 
(2005) success factors, as articulated in Chapter IV. 
Furthermore, this oversight mechanism will aid in reducing the problems 
associated with past block-grant initiatives.  According to the General Accounting 
Office (1982, p. 1), significant oversight concerns developed “Largely because 
many programs were made accountable to the state rather than the federal 
level.”  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 provides for a federal 
role in the oversight of block grants.  Therefore, the oversight committee should 
be comprised of all applicable stakeholders, including the required federal 
representation.  It is anticipated that this inclusionary process will provide the 
necessary guidance, while encouraging collaboration and cooperation among the 
various stakeholders. 
It is apparent that the current process is under great scrutiny from 
Congress and is frustrating localities.  Additionally, because DHS grant goals 
support the homeland security mission and encourage the integration of local 
assets into the national system, federal grants are important to the overall 
process.  By establishing a stakeholder committee to provide oversight, conflict is 
minimized, collaboration is encouraged, and the funding allocation is expedited.  
Additionally, it is clearly evident that states/localities possess a unique knowledge 
of their homeland security needs, therefore, allowing these jurisdictions to 
address their specific needs reasonably translates to a more prepared 
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the oversight process will ensure the application of the 
funds is consistent with national goals and objectives, and evolve the overall 
homeland security enterprise in a positive direction.   
D. BLOCK GRANTS AND COLLABORATION 
In addition to the collaborative aspects articulated to this point, Paul 
Posner (2008) discusses the concept of politics and coercive federalism and its 
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impact on collaboration. He notes that states/locals are essential to the 
mandated policy arena, as their cohesiveness for or against the mandates 
appears to have a considerable influence over the life of the respective 
mandates.  That is, when states/locals bond together, they typically overcome 
the various coercive mandates, but if there is little or no cohesion, then there is 
gridlock and frustration over the mandates.  He notes the following: 
 
 State political cohesion-federal mandates and other forms of policy 
centralization will tend to increase if state and local governments 
are neither united nor effectively mobilized to protect their interests. 
 Federal political cohesion-federal mandates will tend to increase to 
the extent that relevant federal officials are unified and mobilized to 
advance new national goals. 
 Federal-state policy congruence-federal mandates will tend to 
increase to the extent that leading federal and state leaders are in 
agreement about the substantive goals behind the mandate. 
 Alliances-federal mandates will increase to the extent that state and 
local governments do not enjoy the support of politically influential 
interest group or partisan allies. (Posner, 2007, p. 407) 
 
Posner’s (2007) research appears to support the significance of homeland 
security collaboration to achieve desired outcomes, as collaboration is a powerful 
force against restrictive and burdensome mandates.  Additionally, collaboration 
facilitates innovative approaches to not only address specific jurisdictional needs 
but also to better integrate state/local assets with national goals and objectives.  
Posner’s findings may not only reflect the value of collaboration in overcoming 
coercive mandates, it potentially reflects that a lack of collaboration and cohesion 
may actual invite mandates.  In their article “When There is No Calvary,” 
Himberger, Sulek, and Krill (2007, p. 10) note collaboration:  
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Empowers all actors as full partners with unique strengths to offer, 
thus capitalizing on the very best ideas, ingenuity, and innovation 
from across the public, private, and civil sectors—to meet the 
urgent needs of a global citizenry that arguably faces more frequent 
and complex disasters than ever before. 
Considering the unique needs of the various “actors,” a block-grant 
approach reduces the competition and promotes cohesion and collaboration, as 
the actors/stakeholders are then empowered to better prepare. According to 
Kettl, “Ultimately, the nation’s homeland defense will be only as strong as the 
links between the national strategy and the ability of state and local governments 
to support it” (2003, p. 7). 
As discussed during the section on enhancing collaborative capacity, 
efforts must be taken to reduce and/or mitigate disincentives.  This section 
details how the existing DHS grant process serves as a disincentive to the 
collaborative process, as well as efforts to enhance the overall homeland security 
enterprise.  It was noted previously, that as the nation seeks to build a better 
future, it must never forget that “The foundation is the most important part” 
(Kenerson, 2008, p. 40).  Empowering state and locals to address their unique 
needs will serve to bolster such foundation and better prepare the enterprise for 
sustained growth.  In this case, growth is intended to reflect enhancements, not 
more government.  This bottom-up decentralized approach appears to be 
reasonable and consistent with the nation’s federalist principles, as the American 
system of federalism is based on the allocation of roles and responsibilities for 
the various levels of government (White House Office, 2006c). 
E. MOVING FORWARD 
Building upon the foundation established to this point, the next chapter 
seeks to inject an organizational component to the decentralized approach 
proposed thus far.  This more organized concept focuses on information flow in 
the complex intelligence community.  A specified flow of information within a 
decentralized environment comprises what was referred to in the introduction as 
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a hybrid strategy.  It is theorized that enhancing the flow of information will 
encourage better communication and further promote trust across the homeland 
security enterprise.  Additionally, the improvements will serve to facilitate a 
cyclical flow of information, thereby promoting enterprise learning and situational 
awareness at all levels of government. 
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VI. ENHANCING INFORMATION FLOW AND SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS  
Of the various executive abilities, no one excited more anxious 
concern than that of placing the interests of our fellow-citizens in 
the hands of honest men, with understanding sufficient for their 
stations 
Thomas Jefferson, 1743–1826 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The thesis interviews identified significant concerns across government 
with regards to information/intelligence sharing between levels of government.  
One local executive noted, “We hope we are getting the appropriate information 
to best serve the greater good” (Interviews, 2009).  A federal executive wrote that 
he was significantly concerned about “Inappropriate dissemination of non 
confirmed information that may provide disinformation in the overall scheme of 
the event” (Interviews, 2009).  These statements not only draw attention to the 
need to enhance information sharing, they reflect a desire and need to have 
overall situational awareness.  To improve situational awareness, it is apparent 
that information/intelligence must flow freely in a vertical and horizontal manner, 
thereby promoting situational awareness for all stakeholders. 
However, at the macro level, intelligence is fragmented across the federal 
government.  This fragmentation makes it difficult to direct/move intelligence to 
the proper location, and it makes it difficult to truly gain and/or provide situational 
awareness (Jackson, 2008).  Therefore, steps must be taken to enhance 
intelligence sharing among the various levels of government.  Unlike the 
decentralized approach of previous chapters, this section incorporates structure 
as a means to effectively move intelligence across the enterprise. 
In an effort to address this enterprise-wide problem, this chapter builds 
upon the existing intelligence community and draws from success factors 
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discovered in an analysis of Australia’s Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO).  
It is believed that enhancing the U.S. intelligence community involves 
consolidation of the fragmented components, enhanced community outreach, 
and comprehensive oversight.  Collectively, it is theorized that these elements 
facilitate the free-flow of intelligence vertically and horizontally across the 
community enhancing communication, thereby promoting trust, which is essential 
for building collaborative capacity.  In addition, it is anticipated that these reform 
measures will facilitate situational awareness at each of the respective levels of 
government consistent with the principles of federalism. 
B. HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM 
September 11, 2001, compelled change in the United State’s intelligence 
world.  Intelligence resources were forced to migrate from a focus primarily on 
state-sponsored terrorism to the complexities associated with individuals, small 
groups, asymmetry, unconventional tactics, and transnational threats.  This 
transition required the U.S. to change its philosophy about foreign verses 
domestic intelligence (Burch, 2007).  Despite the evolution, Brent Scowcroft, 
former National Security Advisor asserts, “The safest place in the world for a 
terrorist to be is inside the United States. . . . As long as terrorists do not do 
something that trips them up against our laws, they can do pretty much all they 
want” (Burch, 2007, p. 1). 
Scowcroft’s assertion is bold and raises the question, how can this be 
possible?  In an effort to analyze the underlying complexities and identify the 
problems that give rise to an apparent sanctuary for terrorist, the reader must first 
understand the issues of domestic intelligence in the U.S.  According to Burch 
(2007, p. 1), “The area of domestic intelligence raises several issues.  First, law 
enforcement and intelligence operate in different worlds—one seeks to 
prosecute, the other to gather information.”  Additionally, the development of 
intelligence focused state fusion centers and other organizations result in more 
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bureaucracy and less information sharing (Burch, 2007).  These complexities 
cause concern with the protection of “civil liberties and effective oversight” 
(Burch, 2007, p. 1). 
In addition to the issues identified by Burch, the ultimate responsibility of 
intelligence rests with the FBI.  The FBI’s mission is: 
To protect and defend the United States against terrorist and 
foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws 
of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice 
services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and 
partners. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009, p. 1) 
This enormous worldwide responsibility is tasked to a relatively small 
group of sworn personnel.  According to Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey 
(2008, p. 5): 
As the primary investigative agency of the federal government, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority and 
responsibility to investigate all violations of federal law that are not 
exclusively assigned to another federal agency.  The FBI is further 
vested by law and by Presidential directives with the primary role in 
carrying out investigations within the United States of threats to the 
national security.  This includes the lead domestic role in 
investigating international terrorist threats to the United States, and 
in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet foreign entities' 
espionage and intelligence efforts directed against the United 
States. The FBI is also vested with important functions in collecting 
foreign intelligence as a member agency of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community. . . . These roles reflect the wide range of the FBI's 
current responsibilities and obligations, which require the FBI to be 
both an agency that effectively detects, investigates, and prevents 
crimes, and an agency that effectively protects the national security 
and collects intelligence. 
These myriad responsibilities make it difficult for the FBI to be experts at 
any single task, especially one of such importance as domestic intelligence.  
Previous Congressional inquiries identified three specific shortcomings that 
highlight the need for improvements: 
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 The FBI’s decentralized structure and inadequate information 
technology made the Bureau unable to correlate the knowledge 
possessed by its components. The FBI did not gather intelligence 
from all its many cases nation-wide to produce an overall 
assessment of al Qaeda’s presence in the United States. 
 Many FBI field offices had not made counterterrorism a top priority 
and they knew little about al Qaeda before September 11. 
 The FBI also did not inform policymakers of the extent of terrorist 
activity in the United States. “Although the FBI conducted many 
investigations, these pieces were not fitted into a larger picture. 
(Burch, 2007, p. 2) 
 
Despite the significant intelligence role of the FBI, the responsibilities for 
domestic intelligence remains fragmented across the federal government.  For 
example, the Department of Homeland Security “Has primary responsibility for 
protecting and deterring against terrorist attacks; and the NCTC [National 
Counter-Terrorism Center] has primary responsibility for coordinating 
information-sharing and integrating foreign intelligence into the system” (Jackson, 
2009, p. 81).  Expanding from these core agencies is a complex web of agencies 
focused on moving intelligence data throughout the country; many of which 
experience information gaps and fail to effectively communicate (Jackson, 2009). 
This compilation of issues sparked government initiatives and 
considerable FBI reform.  However, these efforts resulted in minimal 
improvements and an ongoing intelligence gap, as the FBI remains tasked with 
multiple responsibilities but lacks appropriate resources and structure.  This 
ongoing problem surfaced during the interviews conducted for this study, when 
one local participant noted, “We hope we are getting the appropriate information 
to best serve the greater good;” and a state participant noted, “I also have 
concerns about the information-sharing dynamic” (Interviews, 2009). To address 
these concerns, it is suggested that more comprehensive reform of the overall 
intelligence enterprise is needed. This effort must focus on creating an 
environment within the FBI that allows it to appropriately meet its many demands.  
These changes must consider public support and oversight, which will serve to 
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enhance the FBI’s ability to perform its many functions and address the 
frustrations and lack of trust across the levels of government. 
An examination of existing domestic intelligence successes offers insight 
into potential improvements for U.S. domestic intelligence efforts. It is anticipated 
that such improvements will not only enhance the FBI’s intelligence capabilities, 
but it will also demonstrate the U.S.’s commitment to protecting the nation from 
another major attack.  Additionally, reform efforts will likely provide clarity, which 
will assist in reducing the competition and confusion between the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities.  By doing so, the FBI will be better 
suited to develop the terrorist nexus from a prevention standpoint (Burch, 2007). 
Mark M. Lowenthal (2006, p. 246) notes legislation continues to expand 
the FBI’s authority “In the gray areas between foreign and domestic intelligence 
and between intelligence and law enforcement.”  Currently, the FBI’s many tasks 
and competing responsibilities result in confusion and force the men and women 
of the FBI to try to be all things to all people.  It is time to revise the intelligence 
enterprise and create an environment within the FBI that provides clarity for the 
“gray” areas and allows the FBI to effectively meet the demands of being the 
nation’s primary federal law enforcement agency. 
C. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN AUSTRAILA 
In an effort to enhance domestic intelligence in the U.S., it is appropriate 
to examine the successes and challenges of similar efforts.  Although less 
complex and much smaller, Australia’s intelligence community offers clear 
concise components that appear to contribute directly to its success.  For these 
reasons, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) was selected 
for this study, as it offers insight into specific success factors that may be 
applicable and aid in enhancing the U.S. intelligence community. 
According to the ASIO 2007–2008 Year in Review, the terrorist threat in 
Australia continues to grow.  Much like the U.S., the greatest threat is found in 
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the Middle East and South Asia.  Additionally, the ASIO reports, “There are other 
threats to Australia’s security beyond terrorism. Australia’s economic strength, 
technological development, and strong global partnerships make it a continuing 
target for espionage and foreign interference” (ASIO Report to Parliament, 2008, 
p. 1).  These threat complexities and challenges have similarities to the threat 
environment in the U.S.; both the FBI and the ASIO are under considerable 
pressure to prevent terrorist attacks. 
The ASIO is comprised of 1,492 employees with a targeted growth of 
1,860 by 2010–2011.  The organization is committed to training, and has 
invested 6.4 million dollars into its Learning and Development Strategy to 
enhance its overall capabilities.  This investment includes capabilities in 
advanced analysis, complex data exploitation, and enhanced operational 
analysis (ASIO, 2008).  The ASIO has furthered developed its partnerships, both 
domestically and abroad; and expanded its officer attachment to various 
agencies.  This effort improved understanding of the organization’s role and 
encouraged information sharing across disciplines.  The ASIO distributes 
intelligence multiple stakeholders including government ministries, law 
enforcement, policy makers, intelligence agencies, and states (ASIO Report to 
Parliament, 2008).  The organization attributes its success to “Rigorous internal 
and external accountability and oversight arrangements . . . [as well as, strong] 
operational policies to ensure they remained relevant and continue to provide 
clear guidance to officers” (ASIO Report to Parliament, 2008, p. 3). 
While there are many agencies collecting intelligence, the ASIO has the 
primary role to conduct “Intelligence investigations into terrorist threats to 
Australia” (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2008, p. 13).  The police 
investigate criminal matters and generate intelligence that aids in terrorism 
prosecutions.  The ASIO and police share relative information and the ASIO 
functions as the primary link between government agencies and other 
intelligence partners (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2008). 
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According to Ms. Margaret Hurley (2009) (Australia’s Senior Liaison 
Officer in Washington, DC), the ASIO was established in 1949 and has evolved 
overtime to meet the nation’s growing threat of terrorism.  The ASIO has no 
executive or arrest powers; therefore, it is not bound by the traditional rules of 
evidence applicable to criminal prosecutions.  The organization collects secret 
intelligence related to foreign and domestic threats.  Because the ASIO lacks 
arrest powers, it enjoys tremendous latitude with special powers to collect 
intelligence; these include: 
 The ability to establish wire/telecommunication intercepts 
 The ability to deploy listening and tracking devices 
 The ability to conduct covert and/or overt searches 
 The ability to gain access to and search computers 
 The ability to inspect and/or examine postal materials 
 The ability to question and/or detain individuals of a terrorism 
interest. (Hurley, 2009) 
 
According to Australian’s Prime Minister John Howard, “In the difficult fight 
against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing more crucial 
than timely and accurate intelligence” (Anslet, 2003, p. 1).  This emphasis on 
terrorism contributes greatly to the success of the ASIO, as the organization 
enjoys comprehensive governmental support. 
Organizationally, the ASIO and the Australian Protective Service (APS) 
are detailed to Australia’s Attorney General. The ASIO is a by-product of a nation 
heavily influenced by the “British philosophy of separating domestic intelligence 
and law enforcement powers” (Burch, 2007, p. 9).  The ASIO works closely with 
the APS, which is similar to the FBI.  These organizations, along with state 
organizations, collaborate through the National Threat Assessment Center 
(Burch, 2007). 
While Australia has not experienced the same terrorist threat as the 
United Kingdom and U.S., the ASIO is recognized as being successful in 
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categorizing and tracking domestic terrorist threats.  The organization enjoys a 
positive reputation for its preciseness and thoroughness.   
On November 18, 2005, Australian authorities foiled the activities of 
two terrorist cells. ASIO and Australian law enforcement agencies 
were able to prevent an attack possibly aimed at critical 
infrastructure as a result of an eighteen-month long investigation 
into individuals with possible linkages to al Qaeda and radical 
Kashmiri groups. Burch, 2007, p. 9) 
In addition to the ASIO’s investigative responsibilities, the organization 
provides input to the Office of National Assessment (ONA), which formulates the 
nation’s strategy.  Oversight for the ASIO is grounded in the organization’s 
statutory responsibilities: ASIO Act of 1979, and the Intelligence Services Act of 
2001.  The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security oversees 
Australia’s intelligence enterprise (Burch, 2009).  This is a robust oversight 
process as “The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an 
independent officer appointed by the Governor-General and located within the 
Prime Minister’s office” (Burch, 2007, p. 10).  This structure affords the IGIS the 
ability not only to work jointly with parliament on oversight issues but also to 
function independently, as the IGIS has access to warrant powers, case files, 
and financial records. 
As an added safeguard, Australia relies heavily on public feedback.  The 
National Security Public Information Guidelines promote public understanding of 
the organization’s mission, as well as the threat to the nation.  According to 
Burch (2007), these guidelines directly correlate with ASIO’s efforts to engage 
the citizens and establish communication portals within the various communities. 
Although the ASIO has been very successful, critics argue their tactics 
have been intrusive and heavy handed.  According to Natalie O’Brian (2008), a 
reporter for The Australian, the ASIO and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
have a strained relationship due to poor communication and mistrust.  O’Brian 
asserts this is largely based on inadequate information sharing.  However, a 
commissioned review, The Street Inquiry, resulted in ten recommendations for 
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improving relations.  According to the AFP, it is working closely with the ASIO to 
make improvements (O’Brian, 2008), which represents proactive steps to 
enhance communication and intelligence sharing. 
Overall, the ASIO’s handling of criticism and its willingness to make 
improvements is a strength.  Additional strengths exist in Australia’s “Strong laws 
governing domestic intelligence, the ability of the executive body to coordinate 
intelligence, and its independent assessment capability” (Burch, 2007, p. 11). 
D. THE ENVIRONMENTS 
According to Brian Jackson (2008) of the RAND Corporation, the U.S. 
faces a greater threat from domestic and imported terrorism than does Australia.  
However, he notes Australia’s risk has greatly increased because of actions by 
former Prime Minister John Howard.  Prime Minister Howard’s close alliance with 
the U.S. and his decision to host major international events magnified his nation’s 
risk.  These major events included the 2000 Olympics, the 2002 Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting, and the 1999–2000 International Force for East 
Timor intervention. (This event generated considerable opposition across 
Indonesia and the wider Muslim world).  Additionally, international agreements 
and globalization increased border movements of money, people, and goods.  
This environment “Rendered redundant the traditional defense afforded to the 
country [Australia] by its geography” (Jackson, 2008, p. 37). 
Australia’s main security concerns center on internal and external threats 
from Islamist extremists associated with al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, an 
Indonesian based group credited with the 2002 Bali Bombings (Sherlock, 2002).  
Prior to the 2002 bombings, many in Australia had considered the nation 
insulated from terrorism, but the targeting of Australians in the Bali Bombings 
demonstrated potential vulnerabilities and false perceptions.  Prior to the 2002 
Bali bombing, “The last serious incident on Australian soil was the bombing of the 
Sydney Hilton Hotel in 1978 in which three people died” (Hughes, 2002).  The 
U.S. asserts the Bali attacks were the work of al Qaeda, but Australia’s position 
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is “Only that the bombings were clearly a terrorist attack (Sherlock, 2002, p. 1).  
In addition to the external threat, Australia is concerned with radicalization within 
its borders, as well has homegrown cell ties with al Qaeda and like affiliates 
(Jackson, 2008). 
Similarly, the U.S. struggles with many of the same threats and both 
nations are under pressure to prevent attacks.  It is anticipated the U.S. will 
endure an evolving threat from Islamic terrorist groups associated with al Qaeda.  
According to the National Intelligence Council (2007), U.S. efforts have 
diminished the probability of al Qaeda to strike the homeland, as the U.S. is 
perceived to be a hardened target.  However, of great concern is waning support 
from world partners.  The National Intelligence Council (2007, p. 6) reports that al 
Qaeda “Will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its 
central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in 
extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its 
capabilities.” 
Like Australia, the U.S. is concerned with radicalization within its borders 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  The National Intelligence Council (2007) asserts the U.S. 
is in a heightened threat environment and will likely remain, as al Qaeda 
continues to enhance its ability to attack the homeland and put operatives in the 
U.S.  The specific threat extends to prominent targets with the goal of mass 
casualties.  Tactics include the use of small arms and improvised explosives; and 
an ongoing effort to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear material.  Additionally, “We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist 
groups—often referred to as ‘single-issue’ groups by the FBI—probably will 
conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories” (National 
Intelligence Council, 2007, p.7). 
As is the case in Australia, U.S. globalization has contributed to the 
increased threat.  Technological advances facilitate communication, where it 
once failed to exist, which allows small, otherwise alienated groups to collaborate  
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and conspire.  The U.S. must be prepared for broader and more diverse terrorist 
activity, as it continues to be viewed as the target of choice for terrorists (National 
Intelligence Council, 2007). 
Like the U.S., the Australian government is very serious and committed to 
fighting terrorism. It recognizes the importance of international and internal 
cooperation and coordination. Both governments emphasize counter-terrorism 
strategies based on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.  The 
ASIO is an integral part of this effort, as its primary focus is prevention.  The 
ASIO enjoys a reputation of being precise and diligent in their efforts to develop 
intelligence for this purpose (Burch, 2007). 
The ASIO grew from the Commonwealth Investigation Service.  The 
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act of 1979 provides the ASIO’s 
statutory authority for operation.  Of significance, is the organization’s lack of 
arrest powers, as it allows the ASIO to incorporate more intrusive tactics of 
intelligence collection.  This arrangement is contrary to the U.S. where the FBI 
collects intelligence and makes arrests.  The ASIO reports it is interested, “Solely 
with collecting and analyzing information on threats to the country’s internal 
security” (Jackson, 2008, p. 39). 
The ASIO functions in a strict oversight environment, where there is 
distinction between executive and legislative oversight.  The 2001 Intelligence 
Services Act enhanced the role of Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security.  The committee is tasked with overseeing Australia’s intelligence 
enterprise.  This committee initiates investigations and/or responds to Attorney 
General Requests about the nation’s intelligence functions.  In addition to the 
committee’s oversight is the previously discussed role of the IGIS.  This 
comprehensive oversight mechanism ensures the ASIO operates within its scope 
of authority.  The ASIO is subject to well-defined and articulated legislation that 
limits its authority and establishes its place in the larger Australian Intelligence 
Community (Jackson, 2008).  This aggressive oversight structure serves to  
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provide checks and balances to the ASIO to facilitate a comprehensive 
intelligence network, as well as providing for situational awareness (Burch, 
2007). 
In contrast, the U.S., without a domestic intelligence agency, relies on the 
multi-tasked FBI for this function.  The FBI serves as the primary federal 
investigating/law enforcement agency and the lead domestic agency for 
collecting intelligence.  The FBI derives its authority from executive orders, from 
delegations by the Attorney General, and from statutory provisions, such as, 50 
U.S.C. 401 et seq. and 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. (Mukasey, 2008).  Additionally, 
the U.S. Constitution limits government’s scope of authority with regards to 
search and seizure and it guarantees due process for citizens.  Unlike Australia, 
the FBI is forced to function within this restrictive environment, which further 
complicates intelligence collection and prohibits more intrusive tactics, absent 
judicial review (Joint Commission on Printing, 2006).  Executive orders and 
legislation have expanded government’s authority in some circumstances, such 
as those articulated in the U.S. Patriot Act (2001); however, the U.S.’s 
intelligence collection authority still remains more restrictive than that of Australia. 
Theses complexities demonstrate the need to establish/promote a sense of order 
within this complex environment, thus, facilitating extensive cooperation among 
the myriad of stakeholders.   
Moreover, legislative and administrative reforms since 2001 have focused 
on enhancing the FBI’s intelligence analysis capabilities independent of its other 
responsibilities.  However, reform success has been minimal, as the intelligence 
community remains fragmented, and the FBI lacks the appropriate resources to 
handle the monumental task of domestic intelligence.   
Furthermore, the U.S. approaches intelligence opposite from Australia; 
that is, the U.S. government subscribes to the philosophy of consolidation and 




appears to be severely lacking.  The desire to consolidate is evident in the below 
excerpt from The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations 
(Mukasey, 2008, p. 10): 
A smart government would integrate all sources of information to 
see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should 
also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence. . . . 
The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be 
overstated. Without it, it is not possible to connect the dots. 
Like Australia, the U.S. oversight is a significant component of the 
intelligence enterprise.  Laws, regulations, and policies define the FBI’s authority.  
These include an emphasis on protecting privacy and civil liberties in a manner 
consistent with the nation’s federalist principles.  However, oversight is a shared 
responsibility among the following: 
 
 The Justice Department's National Security Division 
 The FBI's Inspection Division 
 The Office of General Counsel 
 The Office of Integrity and Compliance 
 The National Security Division's Oversight Section (Mukasey, 2008) 
Also, oversight is found in requirements that the FBI notify the National 
Security Division of investigations involving foreign intelligence collection or 
investigation of U.S. citizens for matters related to national security threats.  
Additionally, the FBI must produce annual reports regarding their foreign 
intelligence collection and allow access “By the National Security Division to 
information obtained by the FBI through national security or foreign intelligence 
activities and general authority for the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security to obtain reports from the FBI concerning these activities” (Mukasey, 
2008, p. 11). The many oversight components in the U.S. system appear to be 
fragmented and not as clearly structured as the Australian system.  In addition, 




As a result of this study, it is apparent that the complexities and diversity 
of the U.S. intelligence environment demand change.  As one federal participant 
noted, the nation must address “Appropriate dissemination and [work] within 
appropriate laws and regulations concerning the dissemination of the 
information.”  The successes of ASIO seem to indicate a U.S. domestic 
intelligence agency may be a feasible solution.  However, there are many 
significant challenges to domestic intelligence in the U.S.  Current laws, policies, 
and political complexities cause significant obstacles for a U.S. Domestic 
Intelligence Agency.  Additionally, it is recognized “That simply having a domestic 
intelligence service is no panacea for eliminating domestic threats” (Jackson, 
2008, p. 18).   
Although many countries have experienced success with a domestic 
intelligence agency, expanding the nation’s large bureaucracy will likely make it 
more difficult to establish trustful relationships with the 18,000 plus law 
enforcement organizations that protect the 89,000 state and local jurisdictions 
(Clovis, 2006; IACP, 2008).  Therefore, is appears more logical to build upon the 
nation’s existing intelligence community by incorporating applicable success 
factors of others. 
1. The FBI 
Existing laws and structures cause the FBI to be the most logical agency 
to coordinate domestic intelligence activities.  According to one FBI supervisor 
(Anonymous, 2009), the “FBI is tasked with law enforcement and intelligence 
functions, which are not mutually inclusive.”  However, he indicates former 
Attorney General Mukasey established new guidelines to clarify both missions.  
Accordingly, the FBI supervisor argues there is no current organization with the 
resources or infrastructure to effectively manage U.S. domestic intelligence.  He 
asserts the FBI routinely collects and analyzes intelligence with the thought of an 
eventual criminal prosecution, which often involves charges of something other 
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than terror-related statutes.  When discussing a U.S. Domestic Intelligence 
agency, he cites the following problematic example, “When we receive 
information from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] it most often can never be 
used in court due to methods and means of collection; they [CIA] operate outside 
the U.S. Constitution” (Anonymous, 2009). 
Despite the FBI’s understanding of the legal system and their willingness 
to embrace additional responsibilities, the challenge of inadequate resources 
continues to plague the organization.  The FBI is involved in law enforcement 
and intelligence operations around the world with tremendous expectations of 
success. 
To address these challenges, it is believed that improvements to the 
existing intelligence enterprise are gained by consolidating U.S. intelligence 
functions within the FBI.  However, it is suggested that intelligence functions be 
separated from the FBI’s law enforcement duties to prevent the perception of 
impropriety or the expansion of Lowenthal’s (2006) “gray area.”  To enhance this 
capability, it is recommended that this endeavor include two critical ASIO 
success factors: a strong centralized oversight mechanism and an active public 
outreach program. 
 Oversight: Currently, U.S. intelligence oversight is shared and 
fragmented across the federal government.  It is recommended this 
responsibility be consolidated and modeled after ASIO’s oversight 
structure.  Following this approach, a U.S. Congressional 
Committee (Bipartisan) should be established to function in an 
oversight capacity, much like Parliament’s Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security.  Additionally, the role of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) should be restructured in a manner 
similar to that of the IGIS.  It is anticipated that these changes will 
strengthen U.S. intelligence oversight by clearly delineating 
responsibility and authority.  Comprehensive oversight will promote 
professionalism and reduce suspicions of inappropriate conduct. 
 Public Outreach: While a strong oversight mechanism encourages 
trust, professionalism, it is further recognized that new 
communication portals will develop from an enhanced public 
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outreach program.  This component promotes public/private 
collaboration and serves reduce suspicion.  Because of the 
success of Australia’s National Security Public Information 
Guidelines, a similar endeavor is recommended for the U.S. It is 
anticipated that a comprehensive program aimed at educating the 
public and eliciting support will promote trust and aid in engaging 
communities in the nation’s intelligence mission. 
In addition to improved oversight and public outreach, additional human 
resources are required.  As articulated in this section, the FBI is heavily tasked 
and understaffed; they embrace their global responsibilities with a mere 31,676 
employees, of which, 12,977 are sworn special agents (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2009).  By consolidating U.S. domestic intelligence within the FBI, 
intelligence functions will no longer be tasked to multiple government agencies.  
Therefore, these positions can be reallocated to the FBI in an effort to provide the 
necessary support to appropriately manage consolidated intelligence functions.  
While some additional positions may be needed, this reallocation will drastically 
reduce the costs associated with adding resources to the FBI. 
It is anticipated that these enhancements will provide a comprehensive 
framework to truly understand the nature of the terrorist threat and provide the 
situational awareness necessary to support the nation’s prevention efforts.  
Accordingly, the distinct benefits are as follows: 
 Prosecutorial decisions are based upon comprehensive criminal 
investigations conducted by professional law enforcement.  
Intelligence investigations are performed by professionals who 
understand the legal system and how investigations migrate from 
intelligence to criminal. 
 Strict oversight promotes integrity and professionalism, and it limits 
the scope of authority and offers protection for civil liberties 
consistent with U.S. federalist principles. 
 Intelligence is consolidated to gain true situational awareness at all 
levels of government. 
 Jackson (2008) asserts intelligence is primarily a prevention 
strategy.  He argues the separation of law enforcement and 
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intelligence functions promotes a culture of prevention. In support 
of Jackson’s argument, intelligence and law enforcement will be 
separate functions within the FBI. 
 Coupled with a strong community outreach program, citizen 
pushback will be limited and outreach efforts will likely enhance 
community involvement. 
 A consolidated intelligence effort will assist in clarifying roles and 
responsibilities, which is likely to facilitate communication across 
the intelligence enterprise. 
 The costs associated with this recommendation are minimal, but 
the benefits are enormous. 
 
The recommendations set forth in this section are not intended to reflect a 
command and control structure, where the FBI issues orders to states, as this 
would be counterproductive to efforts to enhance collaborative capacity.  Instead, 
these recommendations seek to clarify roles and allocate responsibilities across 
government in a manner consistent with the American system of federalism 
(White House Office, 2006c). 
2. Reform in Action 
As an example, intelligence comes to the attention of a local official.  That 
official pushes the intelligence to the appropriate state fusion center, which 
serves as the state’s central repository.  The state fusion center then pushes the 
intelligence to the FBI’s Intelligence Section (Single Federal Repository).  This 
upward flow of intelligence facilitates situational awareness at each level of 
government.  Using this same flow, the FBI will have 50 points of contact (fusion 
centers) when pushing information downward.  This streamlines the flow and 
allows states to maintain situational awareness without being bypassed in the 
process. 
Like the vertical flow of information, the horizontal flow is better facilitated, 
as each level of government is involved in the free flow of intelligence.  Under 
this reformed concept, the federal repository deals with states, not localities—
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states coordinate with localities.  This is consistent with role allocation under the 
concepts of federalism, as noted in the report, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.  In this report, it was noted that the 
American system of federalism depends upon “Allocating roles and 
responsibilities between levels of government by utilizing a layered system that 
requires local governments to first request assistance from their State.  States, in 
turn, must use their own resources, if available, before requesting Federal 
assistance” (White House Office, 2006c, p. 72).  While this document refers to 
the response component, its principles are applicable to the overall coordination 
of our layered system of government. 
It is clear that these recommendations do not comprise the end-all solution 
that will prevent another attack, but they can serve to enhance information 
sharing and provide greater situational awareness. 
3. Moving Forward 
This study has identified many complexities and concerns of the homeland 
security enterprise.  Primary concerns reflect an overall lack of trust and 
collaboration.  To address these challenges, recommendations focused on 
approaches to enhance collaborative capacity by building upon small trustful 
relationships.  This process is further facilitated by consolidating the many DHS 
grants and then decentralizing the overall allocation of the monies to allow states 
and localities to first address their jurisdictional specific needs.  It is anticipated 
that this decentralized approach will encourage enterprise-wide trust, thereby 
enhancing collaborative capacity.  This particular section, introduced an element 
of organization to the overall strategy by consolidating intelligence functions in 
the FBI, reallocating positions from the fragmented intelligence community, 
establishing comprehensive oversight, and developing a public outreach 
program.  This more structured component rounds out the hybrid strategy for 
enhancing the homeland security enterprise.  It is believed that this overarching 
strategy betters prepares the nation for future challenges. 
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The final chapter of this study seeks to pull together each of the previous 
components and provide an understanding of how this hybrid strategy helps the 
myriad of stakeholders understand just where they fit in the homeland security 
enterprise. 
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VII. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
To look up and not down, To look forward and not back, To look out 
and not in, and To lend a hand. 
Nathan H. Dole (1852–1935) 
A. OVERVIEW 
As noted throughout this study, and supported by the study’s interviews, 
protecting the American people must be a shared responsibility across levels of 
governments and the various disciplines that make up the homeland security 
enterprise.  Therefore, if the value of collaboration is so clear, why is it often so 
difficult?  It seems organizational cultures, demands on resources, and varying 
motivations result in barriers that interfere and/or discourage cooperation and 
collaboration (Temple, 2007, pp. 20–28). 
These influences on collaboration highlight the interconnectivity and 
interdependency of the homeland security enterprise. Additionally, the intangibles 
of culture and varying motivations, combined with an all-hazards approach to 
national security, result in what Bellavita’s (2006) “Bubbling swamp of intended 
and unintended consequences.” That is, the homeland security enterprise 
appears to be imploding from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, 
competitive funding, and mistrust. The interviews (2009) conducted as part of this 
thesis revealed the following examples: 
 
 Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies. Uncertain 
about federal agency cooperation with locals.  It is apparent that 
many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, 
and often times do not play well with each other. 
 Concern of open lane of communication.  We hope we are getting 
the appropriate information to best serve the greater good. 
 Locals and Feds would be well served to form and enhance the 
personal relationships. 
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 At this early stage, my concern is other stakeholders may not take 
the threat seriously. 
 Additionally, I would be concerned local agencies would resist the 
immediate assistance being offered by the state and federal 
agencies. 
 Some of the players may feel the need to control the information 
shared among the agencies working to mitigate this threat. This is 
counterproductive. 
 
In an effort to thoroughly examine these complex issues, this thesis 
explored three key areas of literature; the definition of homeland security, 
federalism, and collaborative capacity.  The reader may ask, why this literature? 
First, in order to formulate an improved strategy for the future, one must 
understand the strategy’s purpose, goals, and objectives.  The literature reflects 
homeland security is in one sense a single definition, which needs to be 
addressed with a command and control approach. In another sense, homeland 
security is situational and means something different to the various stakeholders.  
While this research cannot offer a definitive position on this subject, it does 
reflect an evolving future (one of learning and growth) and a tendency toward the 
situational definition of homeland security. Interview participants (2009) 
consistently focused their attention on the public and the fact that “Locals will still 
be responsible for local issues.”  This seems to support the less rigid definition. 
Second, the nation’s governance is grounded in the principles of 
federalism and shared governance.  Therefore, any strategy must incorporate 
these principles to promote ownership and buy-in from the various stakeholders.  
As one local (2009) interviewee noted, “[Homeland security is the] responsibility 
of all of government regardless of affiliation. Each group has priorities and 
obligations.”  This shared approach indicates that the principles of federalism 
delineate specific roles and responsibilities to the various groups or levels of 
government.  This concept was further expanded upon by a state (2009) 
representative who commented, “I say this because the perspective, priorities, 
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and focus are different at every layer. This is useful to the overall effort of 
promoting homeland security because no single layer can focus on everything at 
once.”  These comments reflect the significance of the nation’s federalist 
principles and further support a situational and collaborative approach to 
homeland security. 
Third, the literature surrounding collaborative capacity reflects that all 
homeland security stakeholders must work together as, future challenges are too 
much for any single institution or jurisdiction (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003).  A 
state participant noted: 
Homeland security is the responsibility of all of the entities . . . 
Funding has caused turf wars among agencies.  A cookie cutter 
approach was utilized by DHS in the appropriation of grant funds.  
What works in Wyoming may not necessarily work in Virginia. 
(Interviews, 2009) 
Not only does this statement draw attention to a collaborative approach, it 
notes disincentives caused by the existing competitive DHS grant programs. 
Collectively, an analysis of the literature, participant feedback, and related 
reports, led to comprehensive recommendations for enhancing collaborative 
capacity, reorganizing the DHS grant programs, and reforming U.S. intelligence 
with the goal to enhance cooperation and collaboration in the unique and 
complex world of homeland security.  As noted in the argument and supported by 
this research, the solution appears to lie in a hybrid strategy where some aspects 
are structured and others are decentralized, thereby creating the synergy that will 
evolve enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares the nature for the 
uncertainties of the future. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the document addressing lessons learned from Katrina, it was noted 
that “There is uneven coordination . . . among State and local governments. For 
example, our States and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security 
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strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas” (White House 
Office. 2006c, p. 67).  This statement reflects the complexities and fragmentation 
at a macro level and draw attention to the need for a common ideology to help 
homeland security stakeholders all understand their place the homeland security 
enterprise.  Given the body of research, Table 3 is utilized to illustrate the 
strategic areas to be addressed in order to advance the positives and minimize 
the negatives. 
Table 3.   Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid  
(from Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 36) 
Eliminate 
 Coercive Grant Funding 




 Collaborative Capacity 
 Information Sharing 
 Situational Awareness 
Reduce 
 Competition 
 Enterprise Fragmentation 
 Duplication of roles and 
responsibilities 
Create 
 A Culture of Collaboration 
 DHS Block-grant Funding 
 Centralized Intelligence 
 
Despite all we do, however, Hurricane Katrina was a deadly 
reminder that we can and must do better, and we will. This is the 
first and foremost lesson we learned from the death and 
devastation caused by our country's most destructive natural 
disaster: No matter how prepared we think we are, we must work 
every day to improve. (White House Office, 2006c, p. 1) 
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1. Collaborative Capacity 
The research clearly supports a bottom-up approach based on small 
relationships or circles that evolve from trust and leadership.  To build capacity, 
an ideology must be established based on the homeland security mission “To 
lead the unified national effort to secure the country and preserve our freedoms” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 2).  Leadership, in the form of a 
catalyst with no coercive power, encourages and inspires stakeholders to expand 
their smaller groups.  As these trustful relationships grow their existing capacity 
for conflict resolution is espoused, thus, positively influencing the larger 
collaboration.  However, the myriad of stakeholders must remain flexible and 
patient because building collaborative capacity is largely contingent upon trust, 
which develops when words and actions are consistent. 
As these new relationships form, emphasis should be on seeking new 
members to add value to the relationship, and the overall focus must remain on 
the synergy of the group, not the individual members.  Collaboration is an 
empowering environment, and when they are empowered “People are most likely 
to take risks, experience success, and then feel empowered themselves” (Quinn, 
1996, p. 228).  Supporting the collaboration with multiple champions, who 
embrace conflict will minimize threats and maximize creativity and evolution. 
2. Block Grants 
The author acknowledges building collaborative capacity in a complex 
environment is challenging.  Therefore, efforts must focus on minimizing the 
obstacles, such as the existing challenges found in the competitive funding 
environment of DHS grants.  
The current “Federal grant system for first responders is highly 
fragmented, which can complicate coordination and integration of services and 
planning at state and local levels” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  
Considering this complexity, it is reasonable to surmise that improvements to the 
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federal grant system will aid in creating an environment more conducive of 
cooperation and collaboration. To address this apparent disincentive to 
collaboration, this study proposed consolidating all federal grants with similar 
goals and objectives into a single block grant.  Through collective oversight, the 
funding is allocated to address jurisdictional specific needs in a manner 
consistent with the nation’s homeland security’s goals and objectives.  As with 
the collaborative capacity discussion, the establishment of national goals and 
objectives should be a collaborative process. It is believed that these 
recommendations will further encourage stakeholder collaboration, which: 
Empowers all actors as full partners with unique strengths to offer, 
thus capitalizing on the very best ideas, ingenuity, and innovation 
from across the public, private, and civil sectors―to meet the 
urgent needs of a global citizenry that arguably faces more frequent 
and complex disasters than ever before. (Himberger, Sulek, & Krill, 
2007, p. 10)  
As noted by Donald Kettl (2003, p. 7), “Ultimately, the nation’s homeland 
defense will be only as strong as the links between the national strategy and the 
ability of state and local governments to support it.”  The consolidation of federal 
grants appears to be a way to strengthen the link. 
3. Intelligence Reform 
Another obstacle to collaborative capacity was identified in the highly 
fragmented intelligence community.  This particular component of the research 
involved an analysis of the handling of intelligence in Australia and the U.S.  
Contrary to the research surrounding collaboration and block grants, it is believed 
a more structured approach will facilitate effective intelligence sharing and 
promote situational awareness across the homeland security enterprise.  This 
research supports consolidating U.S. intelligence functions within the FBI.  
However, separate intelligence and law enforcement functions to prevent the 
perception of impropriety or a spill over into Lowenthal’s (2006) “gray area.”  This 
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reform includes two ASIO success factors: a strong centralized oversight 
mechanism and an active public outreach program. 
Currently, U.S. intelligence oversight is shared and fragmented across the 
federal government.  The research supports consolidating oversight by forming a 
U.S. Congressional Committee (Bipartisan) to function similarly to Parliament’s 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.  Additionally, expand the role of the 
Director of National Intelligence to model that of the IGIS.  It is anticipated that 
these changes will strengthen U.S. intelligence oversight by clearly delineating 
responsibility and authority. Strong centralized oversight will promote 
professionalism and reduce suspicions of inappropriate conduct. 
It is apparent that strong oversight promotes professionalism in the 
intelligence community, and builds confidence and support from the public.  To 
further encourage public trust, it is recommended that the U.S. incorporate a 
program similar to that of Australia’s public outreach.  This new program should 
be a comprehensive effort aimed at educating the public and building trust in 
government.   
In addition to improved oversight and public outreach, additional human 
resources are required, as the FBI is heavily tasked and understaffed.  As 
articulated in Chapter VI, the consolidation of intelligence functions allows the 
FBI to gain additional resources without depleting other government agencies.  
This approach minimizes cost, while simultaneously addressing staffing issues.  
It is anticipated that this reform will provide the comprehensive structure 
necessary to fully understand the nature of the terrorist threat and provide the 
situational awareness at all levels of government.  A consolidated intelligence 
community provides clarification of roles and responsibilities; it facilitates 
situational awareness; it facilitates communication; it reduces fragmentation; and 
it streamlines the flow of information. 
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C. AREAS OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The issues discussed in this thesis are vast and influenced by many 
variables.  It is apparent that any one of the categories could have been 
expanded upon and examined as its own thesis topic.  However, the focus of this 
research was to identify existing gaps in the overall homeland security enterprise 
and make recommendations to minimize the negatives and enhance the 
positives.  As a result, this study draws attention to several areas for additional 
research: 
 Consolidating federal grant programs will result in huge monetary 
allocations to the various homeland security stakeholders.  As a 
government of the people, government must remain accountable to 
the people; and therefore, inform them of government’s steps to 
use their money wisely.  This dynamic opens the door for research 
into ways to promote accountability without increasing bureaucracy 
and competitiveness. 
 As described in the research, a collaborative oversight group was 
recommended to oversee the allocation of the consolidated federal 
grants.  Additional research is needed to explore the scope, 
composition, and political influences of this oversight body. 
 One criticism of block grants is inadequate or inappropriate 
spending of allocated funds.  Additional research may explore the 
best course of action for dealing with jurisdictions failing to allocate 
monies in a manner consistent with the homeland security mission. 
 This research recommends FBI reform to address the nation’s 
fragmented and broken intelligence community.  Additional 
research may explore the creation of a Domestic Intelligence 
Agency and its impact on civil liberties. 
 
Collectively, this thesis promotes the concept of decentralization for the 
homeland security operational environment to capitalize on the formation of 
networks that will evolve, ultimately adding value to the larger enterprise.  This is 
similar to Brafman and Beckstrom’s argument that decentralization makes the 
enterprise more resilient and less vulnerable to attacks (2006).  However, this 
thesis proposes a hybrid approach, where a structured intelligence environment 
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facilitates the cyclical flow of timely and accurate intelligence throughout the 
decentralized environment.  This allows the larger network to learn and return 
value to the various smaller networks that comprise the whole.  Considering the 
research and the articulated recommendations, the future of homeland security 
may resemble Figure 1, a strategy canvas.  A strategy canvas is “both a 
diagnostic tool and an action framework for building a compelling . . . strategy” 


























Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas—The Future (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
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D. WHERE DO WE FIT? 
Homeland security is an interdependent environment, referred to as an 
ecosystem by Bellavita (2008, p. 1).  Such interdependency causes one 
component to influence the whole; that is, what may seem logical for a single 
component potentially has consequences for the entire enterprise. 
Jim Ryan and David Shu (2009) conducted research involving the 
influence of extreme events to the financial industry resulting from the 
interdependency of the myriad of institutions.  Their research reflects that large or 
small, the influence of significant events was similar.  Therefore, the goal was to 
“Prepare firms for extreme events or even help sidestep them . . . [as] extreme 
events always seem ‘impossible’ until they happen” (Ryan & Shu, 2009, pp. 36–
37).  Considering the homeland security enterprise is equally as complex as the 
financial industry, the interdependency of the enterprise causes it to be similarly 
influenced.  Consider the September 11, 2001, attacks and the influence on an 
interdependent enterprise. 
At the end of the first week of trading after the destruction of the 
Twin Towers, there was a 14 percent decline in the Dow, which at 
that time was the second worst in history; at the end of the next 
week, there was a $15 billion federal bailout of the airline industry. 
There were fears about oil and gas supplies, which the president 
responded to with demands that the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
be opened for drilling, as a matter of national security; there was 
the requisite article about strapped couples learning to cook at 
home instead of indulging in restaurants; by the end of the year, 
there was the climactic bankruptcy of Enron, a company whose 
deals mystified even its dealmakers, earning it a place in the annals 
of economic arcana long before the advent of the subprime 
derivative. (Junod, 2009, p. 1) 
Seeing that a single incident influences the whole, how do we make sense 
of our individual place in the larger complex enterprise?  The answer seems to lie 
in Dr. Scott Alan Norton’s (active-duty Colonel in the U.S. Army Medical Corps) 
analysis of disease.  He notes: 
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One cannot simply look at the patient's disease. One must also 
recognize the interaction between the patient and the surrounding 
community; the interrelationship between the disease and larger 
societal issues; and the transmission factors involved in a 
disease—“Why did this patient get that disease?” (Hilton, 2007, p. 
99) 
Therefore, when answering the question of where we fit in the homeland 
security enterprise, the answer must be—it depends.  That is, it may depend on a 
comprehensive understanding of the definition of homeland security; it may 
depend on understanding of how federalism shapes our actions to complexity 
and uncertainty; it may depend on our ability to enhance collaborative capacity; 
and it may depend on a combination of all of these interconnected elements. 
Understanding that any jurisdiction may take the lead in today’s incident, 
but find itself a mere role player in tomorrow’s, seems to suggest that perhaps, 
the wrong questions are being asked.  In the context of Dr. Norton’s question 
about why the patient got the disease, the better question for the homeland 
security enterprise may be, “Why is it that we find ourselves wondering where we 
fit in homeland security?”  This study seems to point to a lack of leadership, 
where top-down coercive actions do not coincide with words and policy, thereby 
creating suspicion and distrust across the enterprise.   
According to Ryan and Shu (2009, p. 41), “It is up to a few good leaders in 
each organization to challenge the status quo . . . if there is anything certain . . . it 
is its uncertainty.” What is needed is “A new brand of collaborative and innovative 
leadership” (Elkington, 2008, p. 1).  It is up to homeland security leaders to look 
beyond their individual entities in an effort to add value to the whole enterprise.  
Leaders at the various levels of government must become more transparent with 
one another and recognize that interconnectivity is a strength to build upon. 
In closing, this study truly reflects that there is no clear cause and effect 
relationship that produces the specific answer to the research question.  Instead, 
the answer lies in the ability influence the homeland security enterprise by adding  
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value at the most incremental level; that is, stakeholders must add value when 
and where possible.  By adding individual value, the synergy of the combined 
efforts will move the homeland security enterprise in a positive direction. 
The paths to the house I seek to make. But leave to those to come 
the house itself. 
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APPENDIX A. AUSTRALIA—U.S. COMPARISON 
 
Table 4.   Australia—United States, A Comparison of Key Areas 
 
Topic/Subject Australia United States Similarities Differences 










than the U.S.’s 
48 contiguous 
states 
Australia is an 
island with no 
border nation 




















Population 21,007,310 and 






growing at a rate 
of .88% (Central 
Intelligence 
Agency, 2008) 






of rate of change 
is relatively 
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The U.S. has a 
much larger 
population 























have a large 
concentration of 
whites 






Topic/Subject Australia United States Similarities Differences 
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have a large 
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Australia has a 
higher Muslim 
representation.  










Agency, 2008 & 
U.S. Department 
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governed by a 
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The U.S. has in 
excess of eight 
times the division 
and is highly 
decentralized. 




Agency, 2008).  
Very low 
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English common 
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Both are based 
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expanded their 
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sense of fairness 
since prosecution 






Topic/Subject Australia United States Similarities Differences 
Transportation 461 airports, 
38,550 km of 
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(Hurley, 2009).  
Tasmania is one 
of the world's 
major suppliers of 
opiate products, 








Terrorism is the 
major concern.  
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U.S. increased 
domestic 
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collaborated with 
Canada and 
Mexico.  The 
country has 
ongoing conflicts 
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Terrorism is the 
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both have an 
ongoing drug 
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Australia is a 
major exporter of 
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and the scale of 
the issues are 
magnified in the 
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Topic/Subject Australia United States Similarities Differences 
Security 
Environment 
Main threat is 
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experienced 
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damage from a 
direct terrorist 
attack. (Grono, 
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APPENDIX B. DATA COLLECTION TOOL 
Scenario I: 
 
Intelligence feeds indicate with high certainty that a small group acquired 
explosives and planned to detonate a device near a large metropolitan area in 
Virginia.  Intelligence indicates the group will use a rental van to move the device 
into the center of the respective metropolitan area. 
 
If you are a local representative, please assume that this event is in your actual 
jurisdiction. 
 
Question: What if anything is your agency doing in direct response to this 
intelligence feed? 
 
Question: What if any notifications are you making in response to this 
intelligence? 
 
Question: What is the role of you/your agency at this point? 
 
Questions: What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be 
deployed? 
 
Question: What if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other 
homeland security stakeholders? (Please be specific and explain why you make 
your assertion(s)). 
 
Undetected, the device detonates at metropolitan’s center.  Most buildings within 
3,200 feet of the device are destroyed and/or severely damaged.  Injuries and 
deaths are substantial.  
 
Question: What is your agency doing at this point? 
 
Question: What notifications are you making at this point? 
 
Question: What is the role of you/your agency at this point? 
 
Question: What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be 
deployed? 
 
Question: What level of government is in charge at the scene of this incident 
(local, state, federal, or regional government board? 
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Question:  Other than the actual event (explosion with deaths and injuries), what 
concerns do you have? 
 
Question: With regards to my concerns noted in the last question, I’m most 
concerned with ______________, because__________________. 
 
For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or 
experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following: 
 
I have complete confidence in my organization’s ability to fulfill our role in the 
above scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I am concerned with the level of training of many of the responding agencies. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I am concerned with the level of competency of many of the responding 
agencies. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
Appropriate policies, strategies, and guidelines are in place for a scenario of this 
type. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
My organization is well prepared for this type of scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 




My organization is well trained and equipped for this type of scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
All agencies will work well together with little conflict. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
Considering this scenario, all agencies/stakeholders understand their role and 
where they fit in the overall scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 




You receive a citizen report of an unusual situation.  The citizen reports seeing a 
truck driving through the streets of a densely populated area while spraying 
something from a cylinder into the air.  Local police respond and locate the 
abandoned truck, which appears to have completely disbursed the substance.  
Intelligence and initial investigation indicate the substance may be hazardous. 
 
 
Question: What if anything is your agency doing in direct response to this 
situation? 
 
Question: What if any notifications are you making in response to this situation? 
 
Question: What is the role of you/your agency at this point? 
 
Questions: What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be 
deployed? 
 
Question: What if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other 
homeland security stakeholders? (Please be specific and explain why you make 
your assertion(s)). 
 
Further, investigation reveals the substance is aerosolized anthrax and several 
first responders and citizens have been exposed. 
 98
 
Question: What is your agency doing at this point? 
 
Question: What notifications are you making at this point? 
 
Question: What is the role of you/your agency at this point? 
 
Question: What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be 
deployed? 
 
Question: What level of government is in charge at the scene of this incident 
(local, state, federal, or regional government board? 
 
Question:  Other than the actual event (exposure and injuries), what concerns 
do you have? 
 
Question: With regards to my concerns noted in the last question, I’m most 
concerned with ______________, because ___________. 
 
For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or 
experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following: 
 
I have complete confidence in my organization’s ability to fulfill our role in the 
above scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I am concerned with the level of training of many of the responding agencies. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I am concerned with the level of competency of many of the responding 
agencies. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 




1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
My organization is well prepared for this type of scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
My organization is well trained and equipped for this type of scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
All agencies will work well together with little conflict. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
Considering this scenario, all agencies/stakeholders understand their role and 
where they fit in the overall scenario. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
 
Please record any additional comments about either of these scenarios: 
 
General Questions (These questions are not related to the above 
scenarios): 
 
Question: With regards to homeland security in Virginia, what is working well? 
 
Question: With regards to homeland security in Virginia, what is not working 
well? 
 




Question: If I could change one thing anywhere in homeland security, I would 
change _______________________. 
 
Question: Is homeland security a local, state, federal, and/or regional 
responsibility? (Please explain why your position). 
 
For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or 
experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following: 
 
I have complete confidence in local response, planning, and preparedness 
capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I have complete confidence in state response, planning, and preparedness 
capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I have complete confidence in federal response, planning, and preparedness 
capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
 
I have complete confidence in regional response, planning, and preparedness 
capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
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